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Much of the research on the Palestinian Resistance Movement focuses on the 
period of its most active international terrorism, roughly between the June 1967 Arab-
Israeli war and October 1977. These studies focus largely on the violent acts of the 
movement’s operatives and the movement’s Marxist political theory during this time. 
Less has been written, however, about the movement’s development prior to 1967, or the 
relationship between traditional forms of anti-colonial resistance and tribal violence in 
Palestinian society and the forms of resistance that manifested within the Palestinian 
Resistance Movement. This thesis analyzes the development of political critiques and 
theories on the use of political violence within the organizations of Palestinian Resistance 
between the nakba in 1948 and the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, tracing them back to the 
traditional sociopolitical structures that regulated authority and tribal violence in 
Palestine prior to the twentieth century. Due to a variety of economic and political forces 
 vi 
at work in the region, political authority among Arab Palestinians shifted from rural 
kinship-based networks to urban patronage-based networks between roughly 1858 and 
1922. This resulted in a disconnection between those wielding political and economic 
influence and the population’s center of mass, which remained in the rural hinterlands. 
This dual structure, which ultimately contributed to the failure of nationalist Palestinian 
leaders to effectively harness peasant anticolonial resistance during the British Mandate 
to strategic ends, was a central element in the critique of mid-century Palestinian 
Resistance Movement thinkers, and informed the theories they generated during this 
time. As an illustration of Palestinian resistance thought during this period, I analyze the 
content and editorial perspective of Filasṭīn, a newspaper published by the Arab 
Nationalist Movement from 1964 to 1967. Through this newspaper, the ANM clearly 
articulated a position on Arab government and the use of violence for political ends 
which remained a major influence in the theories of the movement after 1967.  
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The purpose of this paper is to examine the development of the Palestinian 
Resistance Movement’s political theory prior to the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war, in 
particular the political structures that it proposed and the use of armed struggle within the 
movement. I argue that the development of political thought by the movement’s leaders 
during the 1950s and 1960s, particularly regarding the use of violence as a legitimate 
method of advancing the movement’s political objectives, represents a bridge between 
the region’s pre-1948 social structures and the Marxism-inflected terrorist violence that 
dominated the movement’s public personae after 1968.1 During this period, Palestinian 
activist intellectuals attempted to formulate a new social framework after the complete 
disintegration of traditional Palestinian social and political networks that resulted from 
the nakba of 1948-1949. Furthermore, the debates within the movement’s factions were 
part of a process, by which Palestinians after 1948 attempted to analyze the failure of 
“Palestinian Nationalism” to prevent the seizure of Palestine by Jewish Zionist 
immigrants in 1948 and to develop theories for moving forward after the disintegration of 
Palestinian social networks after the nakba. 
                                                 
1 Samir Franjieh analyzed the revolutionary character of the PLFP in 1972, arguing that, while the PFLP 
sought to act as a revolutionary vanguard, in practice they have (at the time of writing) been unable to 
create a political awareness among the refugees, who are incorrectly conflated with a Marxists proletariat 
class because of their marginal economic status. Franjieh also states that, since the leadership of the PFLP 
comprised of middle-class intellectuals, rather than bona fide proletariat, they are unlikely to be able to 
overtake al-Fatah for the leadership of the movement, or to be able to effectively lead a revolutionary 
movement, in general.  Samir Franjieh, "How Revolutionary Is the Palestinian Resistance? A Marxist 
Interpretation," Journal of Palestine Studies 1, no. 2 (1972): 53, 60. 
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Starting in the summer of 1968, the dramatic escalation of the Palestinian 
resistance movement’s violence and its shift into international terrorism garnered the 
attention of the media around the world.2 In particular, violent acts such as the hijacking 
of numerous commercial airplanes by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
and the murder of the 1972 Israeli Olympic Team by the Black September Organization 
were evidence of an evolution in political violence, and attracted the sympathy and 
support of numerous dissidents in Europe, Asia, and the Americas.3 This international 
network engaged in a guerrilla struggle against “the forces of Imperialism,” broadly 
construed as Israel and those agencies or individuals viewed as supporting its occupation 
of Palestine.4 While not immediately apparent to Western observers at the time, there is a 
clear trajectory between the uses of violence to achieve political objectives in traditional 
Palestinian society, and the post-1967 terrorism of the organizations of the Palestinian 
Resistance Movement. While the method of the violent struggle is unique after 1967, the 
                                                 
2 Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State : The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 213-214. 
3 Paige Arthur notes that famed French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre defended the actions of the BSO 
group responsible for the deaths of the 11 Israeli athletes in 1972. Paige Arthur, Unfinished Projects : 
Decolonization and the Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre (London: Verso, 2010), 151. Likewise, Varon 
details the intellectual affinity between the members of the West German “Rote Armee Fraktion” (Red 
Army Faction) and the Palestinians. Stefan Aust, details their training in Palestinian camps and 
collaboration with PFLP and BSO elements to conduct joint operations. Aust Stefan Aust and Anthea Bell, 
Baader-Meinhof : The inside Story of the R.A.F (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 66-
68; Jeremy Varon, Bringing the War Home : The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and 
Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties and Seventies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), 250-
251.  In February 1971, two members of the Japanese Red Army traveled to Beirut to establish contact with 
George Habash and the PFLP. The JRA subsequently maintained close ties to the PFLP, established a 
Beirut base, and conducted numerous joint operations with the Palestinian group. Shigenobu Fusako, the 
JRA’s later had a daughter with Habash. William Regis Farrell, Blood and Rage : The Story of the 
Japanese Red Army, Lexington Books Issues in Low-Intensity Conflict Series (Lexington, Mass. ; Toronto: 
Lexington Books, 1990). 
4 Aust and Bell, 19-22, 37; Farrell, 64-65, 73; Varon, 11, 34. 
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theoretical basis of its application lies in the period between the Palestinian nakba, in 
1948, and the defeat of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan by Israel in June 1967. 
Prior to the nineteenth century, local authority in Palestine was exercised through 
kinship-based tribal systems, in which rural clan leaders, who wielded great local 
influence through a mixture of economic control and kinship-based allegiances, 
employed tribal warfare as a routine element of local politics.5 This warfare was 
circumscribed by local custom and conducted to achieve limited strategic objectives or to 
influence negotiations. Between the 1839 and 1936, a number of processes, both external 
and internal to the region, led to the growth of a class of urban-based merchants and 
intellectuals.6 By the end of World War I, these town-dwellers had come to dominate the 
region’s economy, and therefore its nascent political structures, although the rural leaders 
maintained a large degree of influence among the peasantry. In this bifurcated political 
environment, the new urban elite proved incapable of marshaling the rural population of 
Palestine in support of their efforts to oppose Zionist expansion or to influence policy 
during the period of British administration of the region after World War I.7 The 
fruitlessness of the Palestinians’ efforts enabled the rulers of Egypt, Iraq, and 
                                                 
5 Issa Khalaf, Politics in Palestine : Arab Factionalism and Social Disintegration, 1939-1948, Suny Series 
in the Social and Economic History of the Middle East (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
1991), 12-13. 
6 Ibid., 11-13; J. Reilly, "The Peasantry of Late Ottoman Palestine," Journal of Palestine Studies 10, no. iv 
(1981): 53. 
7 Yehoshua Porath’s encyclopedic 2-part study on the Palestinian nationalist movement during the British 
Mandate details the creation of  political parties and factions by members of the Palestinian urban elite and 
the struggles of these individuals, most notably Mohammed Hajj Amin al-Husayni, the Grand Mufti of 
Jerusalem, to dominate the movement and to exclude rival clans. See Yehoshua Porath, The Emergence of 
the Palestinian-Arab National Movement, 1918-1929 (London,: Cass, 1974); Yehoshua Porath, The 
Palestinian Arab National Movement : From Riots to Rebellion (London ; Totowa, N.J.: F. Cass, 1977). 
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Transjordan, driven by their own territorial ambitions, to assume a primary role in the 
region’s determination during the 1940s.8  
Despite these states’ efforts to prevent the Zionists’ expansion, in 1948 and 1949 
hundreds of Arab Palestinians were killed and thousands expelled from the territory as 
the state of Israel was established.9 The exiled survivors, separated from their homes and 
lands experienced intense trauma and despair and many a desire to undertake violent acts 
of resistance and revenge within the “occupied” territory. Palestinian and Arab political 
thinkers and intellectuals analyzed the defeat in the hopes of overcoming the Jewish state 
and regaining dominance in the region.10  
While many young Palestinian activists blamed the patronage-based political 
structure and the selfish ambitions of the Arab states for Israel’s victory and the 
Palestinians’ destitution, regime change in Iraq and Egypt during the 1950s  made some 
optimistic that these new military regimes might be more capable and less corrupted by 
the West than were the old monarchies. Inspired by the theories of Arab Nationalism, a 
group of these Palestinians allied themselves with the new Egyptian president, Gamal 
‘abd al-Nasser, convinced that the Arabs could not defeat Israel unless unified, and so 
                                                 
8 In the case of Hajj Amin, in particular, his efforts to personally control the national movement caused him 
to seek the involvement of the Arab states, particularly after being exiled from the region by the British in 
1937. Z. Elpeleg and Shmuel Himelstein, The Grand Mufti : Haj Amin Al-Hussaini, Founder of the 
Palestinian National Movement (Portland, Or.: Frank Cass, 1993), 56-60. 
9 While not within the scope of this paper, Filastin published a number of articles detailing aspects of the 
1948 nakba. These articles, which focused specifically on violent episodes suffered by the Palestinians, 
such as Israeli siege of the village of Deir Yassin, echoed the themes of trauma and loss that were central to 
Filastin’s engagement with Palestinian cultural identity, which will be discussed in chapter three of this 
paper.  
10 George Habash, "Taking Stock: An Interview with George Habash / Mahmoud Soueid," Journal of 
Palestine Studies 28 i, no. 109 (1999): 90; I. S. Lustick, "Changing Rationales for Political Violence in the 
Arab-Israeli Conflict," Journal of Palestine Studies 77, no. 20 i (1990): 66. 
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achieving that unity must be prioritized before initiating armed struggle against Israel.11 
Others, most notably al-Fatah, still critical of the role of the Arab states and traditional 
Palestinian political structures, committed themselves to immediate guerrilla action 
against Israel – without being tied to any of the Arab regimes.12 
The competition between these two camps increased throughout the mid-1960s, 
as al-Fatah and likeminded groups increasingly pressured the nationalists to join their 
campaign of guerrilla warfare, in the hope of provoking a second war between Israel and 
the Arab states. Within the nationalist faction, in particular the Arab Nationalist 
Movement, which was closely tied to al-Nasser, a growing number of the faction’s 
Palestinian militants pressed for a greater level of guerrilla activity.  
In the first chapter, I will analyze the political structures of pre-1948 Palestine, 
and traditional structures of peasant resistance; arguing that sweeping social changes 
started during the 19
th
 century led to a theoretical disconnect between Palestinian Arab 
political activity, which came to be based in the urban centers, and the rural masses, who 
still engaged in traditional forms of resistance against British military and police forces 
and Zionist settlers. 
In chapter two, I will analyze the political perspectives of two generations of 
politically active Palestinians between 1948 and 1967. While the political notables who 
wielded authority prior to the nakba adhered to pre-1948 patronage-based political 
models, the next generation – younger Palestinians who became politically mature during 
                                                 
11 Habash: 90. 
12 Abu Iyad and Eric Rouleau, My Home, My Land : A Narrative of the Palestinian Struggle (New York: 
Times Books, 1981), 20-21. 
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the 1950s – attempted to reject this structure. This new generation of politically active 
Palestinians became divided into two camps. One camp, exemplified by Yasir Arafat’s 
al-Fatah rejected pre-1948 notable politics through a critique of the existing Palestinian 
political system and argued for immediate violent resistance against Israeli occupation of 
Palestinian lands. The other group, which initially subscribed to a similar critique of the 
role of patronage-based politics in the Arab states’ involvement in Palestine, was 
impressed by the new regimes that came to power in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq after 1952, in 
particular the nationalist ideas of Egyptian President Gamal ‘abd al-Nasser.  These 
Palestinian activists, typified by George Habash, the founder of the Arab Nationalist 
Movement (and later the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine) also called for 
guerrilla resistance, but believed that this resistance would ultimately be unsuccessful 
unless Arabs were able to unify and rectify the factionalism that was responsible for the 
Arab defeat in 1948. I argue that the leaders of these two factions shared many 
similarities in background and experience and that the primary distinguishing feature 
between them was the primacy they placed on armed resistance in the liberation of 
Palestine. The contention between those who advocated immediate armed resistance, and 
those who deferred guerrilla warfare until a future time when appropriate conditions were 
established grew between 1965 and June 1967. This conflict, as we shall see, was not 
only present within the two major Palestinian factions, but also within the individual 
groups, themselves. In particular, the Arab Nationalist Movement experienced a 
prolonged period of near-fragmentation from mid-1966 until after the June 1967 war 
when, no longer able to reconcile its internal conflicts, the group fragmented. 
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 In the final chapter, I will analyze the content and style of one of the Arab 
Nationalist Movement’s major official newspapers, entitled Filastin, which the 
organization published in Beirut from late-1964 until June 1967. This particular 
newspaper, in which the ANM responded directly to al-Fatah and its calls to armed 
struggle, clearly demonstrates the ANM’s pan-Arab perspective. In addition to Filastin’s 
overt political content, which I will show clearly voiced support for al-Nasser and the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization, I will examine the way in which the publication 
advanced complimentary themes through its engagement with elements of Palestinian 
culture, in particular Palestinian poetry and literature. Through these pieces, Filastin 
made its own contribution to post-nakba analysis of the Palestinian condition. Finally, I 
will examine Filastin’s stance on guerrilla warfare throughout the newspaper’s 
publication, which I will argue continued to support Gamal ‘abd al-Nasser’s official 
position on guerrilla entanglement with Israel, yet also evolved in response to the 
growing call for armed action within the resistance movement. 
 The theories produced by this group of Palestinians between 1948 and 1967 
informed their thoughts and actions after the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War, albeit in 
surprising ways. For those in the al-Fatah camp, the experiences during and after the 
1967 war apparently confirmed the position they had taken since 1964. The political 
capital this generated augmented the influence they had garnered through their unceasing 
support for armed struggle, in particular their victory in March 1968 against the IDF 
siege of the town of Karama, and enabled them to capture a controlling representation in 
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the PLO, despite their previous criticism of the organization.13 As for Habash and the 
ANM, the ideological exploration prompted by the Arab defeat in 1967 did not cause a 
change in his views toward the legitimacy of armed struggle, but rather removed the 
constraints placed upon it by his support of Gamal ‘abd al-Nasser.14 
  
                                                 
13 Sayigh, 667. 
14 Yezid Sayigh, "Reconstructing the Paradox: The Arab Nationalist Movement, Armed Struggle, and 
Palestine, 1951-1966," Middle East Journal 45, (1991): 618-620. 
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Chapter 1 – The Shape of Anti-Colonial Resistance in Palestine during 
the British Mandate 
Through a series of economic and sociopolitical transformations that occurred 
over the course of the nineteenth century, administrative and economic authority in 
Palestine shifted from the rural shuyukh to powerful urban families, radically altering the 
traditional structures of authority in the region. Despite the transformation of rural 
society, peasant warfare and resistance to both British forces and Zionist settlers retained 
distinctly traditional characteristics throughout the British Mandate. While peasant 
violence retained traditional aspects, the transition of political authority from rural to 
urban leaders created a disconnect between those recognized by the British to negotiate 
on behalf of the Palestinian population and those capable of providing direction and 
structure to peasant resistance. Ultimately, this prevented coordination between the two 
camps and a lack of orientation or strategy in peasant violence in the decades leading up 
to 1948.  
In this chapter, I argue that the transition of authority, from traditional rural 
leaders to the developing group of town-based elites eliminated the traditional framework 
that circumscribed the use of peasant violence in Palestine and had previously provided it 
with strategic direction. In effect, tribal patterns of warfare continued throughout the 
Mandatory period, directed against British forces, Zionists, and even other Palestinian 
Arabs, but without the limitations on its acceptable use and goals that had traditionally 
been provided by rural leadership. 
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In this chapter, I will first describe the social and economic structure of 
Palestinian society at the beginning of the 19
th
 century, and the networks of authority 
around which it was oriented. I argue that during this time, peasant violence was 
organized within a rigid framework of custom, which the rural shuyukh exercised for 
specific political objectives. The use of the term “political” in this context is liberal; they 
engaged in limited warfare for limited gains and to settle local disputes and seldom 
engaged in protracted military campaigns. Second, I will describe the structural changes 
Palestinian society experienced as a result of the Ottoman Tanzimat reforms of the 19
th
 
century, and the shift this initiated from a rural dominated society to one in which the 
center of local authority rested in the urban centers. I argue that this shift in authority 
removed the traditional constraints from peasant warfare. I will then analyze the 
Palestinian revolt of 1936-1939, in which I argue the political disconnect between urban 
and rural centers of authority can be clearly seen and which ultimately prevented the new 
urban political elite from influencing the widespread peasant unrest to advance their 
political objectives. 
PEASANT LIFE AND THE CENTRALITY OF THE VILLAGE 
Palestine remained overwhelmingly agrarian at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century. Ottoman administrative practices in the region from the eighteenth to the mid-
nineteenth century had resulted in a withdrawal of the peasantry from the much more 
fertile coast and plains to the rugged and hilly hinterland of the territory in response to 
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increased Bedouin control of those zones.15 For defense against the dangerous and 
uncertain conditions of the Palestinian and Syrian environs, rural society developed a 
distinctly communal character, in which the center of peasant life was the village. This 
communalism was reflected in the social and economic institutions that developed in the 
region and in the structures by which local authority was exercised. The typical 
Palestinian village was composed of four to five clans or kinship groups (hamula, pl. 
hama’il).16 Within these villages, the profitability of agriculture from year to year 
strongly encouraged the development of stable systems of land tenure. Through 
intermarriage and shared narratives of origin, these small hamlets developed a highly 
cohesive social structure.17 Additionally, these same economic concerns led the rural 
population to remain generally static and villages experienced very little in or out 
migration. This further contributed to village stability and to close relations between the 
residents.18 The resulting social structure was so cohesive that, when newcomers did 
move into a village, they were sometimes forced to create fictitious kinship ties with one 
of the resident hama’il to fully integrate into village life.19 Palestinian villages were 
conspicuously self-sufficient, as well, compared to the rest of the Levant and Syria, 
which further contributed to their insularity by reducing the need for well-developed 
                                                 
15 Issa Khalaf, Politics in Palestine : Arab Factionalism and Social Disintegration, 1939-1948, Suny Series 
in the Social and Economic History of the Middle East (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
1991), 11-12. 
16 J. Reilly, "The Peasantry of Late Ottoman Palestine," Journal of Palestine Studies 10, no. iv (1981): 90. 
17 S. Atran, "Hamula Organisation and Masha'a Tenure in Palestine," Man 21, (1986)., discusses the social 
structure of these villages, in depth, and their ability to withstand outside intervention and land 
appropriation. Rosemary Sayigh, Palestinians : From Peasants to Revolutionaries : A People's History, 
Middle East Series No 3 (London: Zed Press, 1979), 14. 
18 Reilly: 90. 
19 Ibid. 
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intra-regional trading or social networks. Although ownership of all land ultimately 
remained in the hands of the Ottoman Sultan, land usage was administered within the 
villages through a variety of systems, which varied across the region.20 Village officials 
were usually chosen from among the local population and, as previously noted, 
immigration in or out of villages was uncommon. Diminishing the need for strong 
regional networks among the peasantry, Palestinian villages were highly self-sufficient, 
and with the exception of a few towns that produced cash crops for export, typically 
provided for their own subsistence needs through raising foodstuffs.21 
Prior to the Ottoman reforms of the second half of the nineteenth century, the 
center of authority in the village was the sheikh (pl. “shuyukh”), the leader of a powerful 
local family that, through its strength, attracted the allegiance of weaker, more vulnerable 
families needing protection. Over years, these strong families acquired significant wealth 
and influence, through which they solidified their positions of prominence and authority 
in the community. In lieu of a strong Ottoman presence, the sheikh was responsible for 
collecting taxes and remitting payments to the appropriate officials, settling local 
                                                 
20 Land tenure in rural Palestine has been the subject of much research. Many of the studies conflict over 
the type of administrative arrangement that dominated, but several have been found to have been 
particularly prevalent. These include waqf, in which land was permanently endowed for the support of an 
institution—generally religious or educational—and iltizam, or tax-farming—which were both common 
across the Ottoman Empire. See Roger Owen, The Middle East in the World Economy, 1800-1914 (London 
; New York: Methuen, 1981), 35. In Palestine and parts of southern Syria, a significant amount of the 
arable land was controlled at the village level under a system of cultivation called musha’ or mushaa. In it, 
a village’s holdings were sub-divided into parcels which were distributed between the members of the 
community, and would then be cultivated communally. Pastoral land was held in common by all of the 
village’s residents. While villagers had no legal claim to the land, the stability of the village population led 
to the continuous cultivation of the land by the same families over generations, which produced strong 
feelings of customary rights of tenure. J. Ruedy, "Dynamics of Land Alienation," Transformation of 
Palestine Edited by I. Abu-Lughod., (1971): 123. Also see Ya'akov Firestone, "Crop-Sharing Economics in 
Mandatory Palestine - Part I," Middle Eastern Studies 11, no. 1 (1975); Ya'akov Firestone, "Crop-Sharing 
Economics in Mandatory Palestine: Part Ii," Middle Eastern Studies 11, no. 2 (1975). 
21 Sayigh, 27. 
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disputes, overseeing the partition of the village’s farm land, and represented the 
community in relations with other villages or Ottoman authorities.22  
Each of Palestine’s eighteen districts, or nawahi (s. nahiya), was also controlled 
by the sheikh of a powerful clan, who exercised authority over the villages in the nahiya. 
Control over territory and its resources was hotly contested among the Palestine’s leading 
families and nahiya dominance frequently shifted between clans as a result of political 
maneuvering or military action. Like that of the village shuyukh, the authority of the 
leading clans of the nawahi was based upon patronage networks which they had built 
over time through their strength in warfare and ability to provide security to weaker 
families who allied with them.23 These local networks were sustained through a system of 
tribal alliances that extended throughout Syria and Lebanon, which “exercised a powerful 
influence on the loyalties of Palestinian Arabs”24 and helped the shuyukh preserve their 
position in the region. By the nineteenth century, dominance of the region rested within a 
handful of very strong families, which vied with each other for local control. In 
Jerusalem, for instance, several main families – the Abu Ghush, the Husaynis, the 
Nashishibis, and the al-Khalidis – vied with each other for dominance.25 In the seven 
nawahi that constituted the “Jabal Nabulus” area, however clans such as the Tuqans and 
                                                 
22 Khalaf, 12. 
23 Reilly: 91-92. 
24 Ibid.: 92. 
25 Illan Pappe’s two-part study of the ascendance of the Husayni family during the nineteenth and early 
twentieth century discusses in-depth the family’s contestation with other local clans over the leadership of 
Jerusalem. Ian Pappe, "The Rise and Fall of the Husaynis, 1840-1922 (Part 1)," Jerusalem Quarterly File 
10, (2000). Also see Reilly: 91-92. 
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Nimrs were prominent.26 All kinship groups aligned themselves with either northern 
(Qays) or southern (Yaman) tribal coalitions through narratives of origin, by which they 
traced their ancestry through fictive lineages to pre-Islamic Arabia.27 These clan alliances 
cut across geographic and religious boundaries and families of the same religion or sect 
could belong to either camp. However, factional allegiance was flexible, and villages or 
families could change allegiance if it served their interests, potentially resulting in 
villages or even families split between the factions. A prominent family, by influencing 
others to switch allegiance, could expand its client base, increasing its power relative to 
competing clans and its social and economic dominance in the region.28  
Due to the degree of their influence over the peasant population and the 
associated military strength they came to be able to harness, by the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire determined that, rather than attempt to oppose 
the power of the shuyukh, it would be more beneficial to recognize them officially and to 
incorporate them into the structure of administration. In an attempt to find local officials 
“who could collect taxes and remit them on time”29 the nawahi shuyukh were invested 
with the authority to collect taxes, resolve disputes over land, and provide security in the 
local area. The result of this was an inherent conflict, in that they depended upon the 
Ottoman governor for their authority, but upon the peasantry their income. The more 
                                                 
26 Miriam Hoexter gives a detailed account of this process in the seven nawahi which constituted the “Jabal 
Nablus” area during the nineteenth century. Miriam Hoexter, "The Role of the Qays and Yaman Factions in 
Local Political Divisions. Jabal Nāblus Compared with the Judean Hills in the First Half of the Nineteenth 
Century," Asian and African Studies (Israel) 9, (1973). Also Pappe: 30. 
27 Hoexter; Khalaf, 12; Pappe: 29. 
28 Khalaf, 12-13. 
29 D. R. Divine, Politics and Society in Ottoman Palestine: The Arab Struggle for Survival and Power, vol. 
Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994 (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994), 30-31. 
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skilled were able to balance the economic hardship imposed upon the peasantry, in order 
to maintain their support, with the demands of the governor, to maintain his 
appointment.30  
In the larger towns and cities, Ottoman administrators relied on an additional 
stratum of native urban elites to influence local politics. Because administrators were 
dispatched from Istanbul and served short terms—typically a year—the ability of these 
foreign valis and pashas to wield any significant local influence was limited.  While this 
was intended by the empire to prevent them from raising sufficient local power to 
challenge the authority of the empire, this forced them to exercise many of their tasks 
through the local social and economic elites. These “notables,” known collectively as 
a’yan, included not only the heads of large landowning families who had relocated from 
the villages to the cities, but also religious leaders and merchants who, through their 
integral roles in local religious and legal institutions these families exercised considerable 
influence within the urban population.31 
PATTERNS OF RURAL RESISTANCE IN OTTOMAN PALESTINE 
Peasant violence in Ottoman Palestine typically occurred in a specific pattern, and 
within circumscribed limits.32 When the shuyukh mustered his peasants, either to battle 
rival factions or in the course of negotiations with Ottoman officials, fighting was 
conducted according to established traditions regarding the acceptable purposes and 
                                                 
30 Ibid., 31. 
31 The a’yan were defined by Albert Hourani as “those who can play a certain political role as 
intermediaries between government and people, and… as leaders of the urban population.” Albert Hourani, 
"Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables," in The Modern Middle East : A Reader, ed. Albert 
Hourani, Philip S. Khoury, and Mary C. Wilson(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 89. 
32 Divine, 50. 
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scope of armed conflict in order to achieve limited objectives.33 Elites might muster their 
supporters to influence negotiations with Ottoman officials, to acquire territory from or 
challenge a rival family, or in response to an affront to the family’s honor, but rarely 
sought large territorial gains and continued negotiations during periods of violence. 
Frequently, hostilities ceased when the attacking party had gained the political upper 
hand or inflicted an appropriate response against the offending party. Because of the need 
of the peasants to work their fields, fighting occurred only in part of the day and 
campaigns were generally not conducted during the sowing season. Also, peasants tried 
to keep the number of casualties to a minimum, as custom dictated that blood payments 
be made for those killed in battle after the conclusion of hostilities.34 Rather than suffer 
long periods of mobilization, peasants mustered for battle would withdraw and return to 
their fields after spending a “reasonable amount of time” in the battle.35  
In addition to disputes over territory and taxation, opposition to conscription and 
disarmament was a major incentive to the Palestinian peasants and their shuyukh to 
revolt.36 Because Palestinian society was both kinship-based and agrarian, long-term 
conscription and protracted warfare were particularly hazardous to the peasants, as they 
not only impacted crop production in the short-term, but the loss of a family’s sons could 
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endanger the survival of the clan.37 Furthermore, unlike in traditional tribal warfare, 
where peasants fought alongside family members under the leadership of local elites, 
none of the traditional ties of patronage existed between the Palestinians and the military 
officials whom they served when conscripted.38 One example of this is the Palestinian 
revolt in 1834 against the Egyptian occupation under Ismael Pasha, which lasted from 
1831 to 1840. In response to increasing taxes and efforts by the Egyptians to 
simultaneously disarm and conscript the local population, Palestinians across the region 
rebelled, engaging in mountain ambushes and hit-and-run attacks against Egyptian 
military units in order to offset their technological advantage.39 By June, the rebels 
dominated all of Palestine but the major cities and even infiltrated and captured 
Jerusalem, forcing the Egyptian forces there to take refuge in the citadel. 40 Ultimately, 
Mohammed Ali mounted a violent counterattack to break the revolt with reinforcements 
from Egypt. The Egyptians destroyed entire villages, demolishing the homes of the rich 
and burning those of the poor as they pursued the Palestinians who continued the revolt—
rich and poor. Many leaders were either exiled or executed.41 
 
RURAL EFFECTS OF REFORM 
In the last decades of the eighteenth century, demand for Palestinian products 
abroad caused an increase in trade and in the importance of the towns, particularly in the 
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coastal region, prompting Istanbul to attempt to strengthen its authority over its provinces 
in an effort to improve the consistency of dwindling and unreliable tax payments. Despite 
the relative inconsistency of Ottoman authority in Palestine, the increasing economic 
production of the region’s trade strengthened the Ottoman governors, allowing them to 
increase their military reach into the rural areas and to more directly challenge to power 
of the traditional elite families.42 By the beginning of the second quarter of the nineteenth 
century, Ottoman authority had been consolidated in the larger towns and Ottoman 
military forces were successfully expanding the amount of terrain that could be securely 
occupied and cultivated by the peasants, allowing increased inhabitation and exploitation 
of the fertile plains.43  
This consolidation set the stage for the Ottoman Empire to enact a series of 
reforms over the remainder of the century known collectively as the Tanzimat. These 
measures were intended to modernize the empire and to bring its subjects—the vast 
majority of whom were unpropertied peasants—more directly under Istanbul’s control.44 
Instituted in 1839 due to growing concern in Istanbul of being outstripped by the 
economic and military power of post-Industrial Revolution Europe, the reforms of the 
Tanzimat introduced modern economic systems and technological infrastructure, as well 
as modern bureaucratic and administrative institutions modeled on those of Europe. 
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Additionally, as an increasing number of the empire’s subject groups appeared inclined to 
seek increased autonomy, or independence as in the case of the Greeks in the 1820s, 
these reforms sought to tie the empire’s population together more directly. In particular, 
the empire hoped to reach out to its non-Muslims and rural peasants, whose ties of 
allegiance to local leaders were much stronger than those to the Sultan. Specific reforms 
included in the Ottoman project included the introduction of paper currency, the post 
office, the telegraph and railroad, the abolition of slavery, and the removal of special 
legal and tax status based on religious affiliation. By the time of entrance of the Ottomans 
into World War One in 1914, these changes had resulted in a dramatic restructuring of 
the social and economic organization of rural Palestine. While the program was initiated 
in 1839, the reforms did not begin to be implemented in Palestine until after the 
restoration of the area to Ottoman control in November 1840. 
A main pillar of the Tanzimat was a set of initiatives targeting the military and 
social authority of the shuyukh, which was a direct challenge to the empire’s centralizing 
efforts. Central to this was attacking the economic basis of the shuyukh’s authority—their 
role as rural tax collectors. After an initial unsuccessful attempt to collect taxes directly 
from the peasants, the empire instead transferred the duty to newly-formed district 
councils, composed of members of the a’yan, who then granted the office of tax collector 
to the highest bidder.  This gradually led to the removal of the function of tax collector 
from the rural shuyukh, who were not able to stand up to the competition of the a’yan.45 
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In 1858, the Sultan enacted a further measure intended to break the long-standing 
ties of patronage between provincial elites and peasants. Through the Land Law of 1858, 
the Sultan hoped to create a patronage relationship directly between himself and the 
peasantry, by allowing peasants to register direct ownership of their land, thereby 
circumventing the local shuyukh and intermediaries previously responsible for tax 
collection. The Vilayet Law of 1864 targeted the administrative authority of the rural 
shuyukh, by creating a new administrative post at the village level—that of the 
mukhtar—which was intended to replace the sheikh as the intermediary between the 
government and the peasantry. Despite their changing role in the local community, and 
decrease in administrative power, the social status of the shuyukh remained strong, as did 
their local influence. The shuyukh continued to represent the peasants in dealings with the 
political world outside the village, even into the twentieth century.46 
As the Ottoman reforms eroded the shuyukh’s privileges and traditional bases of 
authority, the a’yan utilized their position in the Ottoman administration to strengthen 
their own standing. Through their dominance of the district councils, the a’yan were able 
control the implementation of Ottoman reform measures and to defeat attempts by the 
Ottoman administrators to check the growth of their influence.47 In addition to replacing 
the rural shuyukh in the role of tax collector, throughout the last third of the nineteenth 
century the a’yan were able to manipulate the registration of land under the law of 1858 
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in order to accumulate vast estates. Confident that their traditional rights of tenure were 
secure, Palestinian peasants saw no need to register the land they had cultivated for 
generations and were hesitant to expose themselves to greater government scrutiny due to 
fear of more conscription and greater taxation. Instead of registering land in their own 
names, what land they did register they preferred to do so in the names of the local elites 
upon whom they traditionally relied for protection. Rather than ensure that land was 
registered in the cultivators’ names, the a’yan were able to register significant amounts of 
land in their own names. Through this process, the a’yan were able to acquire the title to 
the lands from which they collected taxes. Following the Law of 1867, which changed 
the payment of taxes from cash from kind, the peasants came became increasingly 
indebted to their new landlords, enabling the a’yan to further expand their holdings.48 
This process continued until the Ottoman defeat in World War One brought Palestine 
under British administration. 
PALESTINIAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT DURING THE EARLY MANDATE 
The abrupt dismemberment of the six-century-old Ottoman Empire after its defeat 
in World War One fundamentally changed the political topography of the entire Middle 
East.49 The British administration of Palestine, authorized by the League of Nations, was 
radically different from that of the Ottoman Empire from its inception. First, pursuant to 
the Balfour Declaration, by which Britain had pledged to support the creation of a Jewish 
national homeland in Palestine, the British administration was politically constrained to 
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support a growing number of Jewish immigrants to the region. These immigrants, known 
as the Zionists, began immigrating from Europe in the late 19
th
 century, and despite 
Ottoman efforts to limit the flow Jews into the country in response to Arab opposition, by 
1922 the Jewish population of the region had grown from approximately 24,000 in 1822 
to 60,000.50  A great deal of the British’s  efforts were invested in mediating between the 
Palestinian Arabs and this community, called the Yishuv, particularly as Palestinian Arab 
opposition to the growing Zionist population became increasingly violent throughout the 
1920s and 1930s.  
Second, while the British were committed, in principle, to maintaining the 
traditional structure of Arab life in Palestine, the region’s history belied this as a 
legitimate objective.51 As the region had never before existed as a single polity, the 
construction of boundaries and the reorganization of the territory within in relation to 
itself necessarily created a new political reality. Furthermore, the British based their legal 
framework upon existing Ottoman laws, which had been administered with a great deal 
of flexibility and imprecision by the Empire, rather than the prevailing socio-political 
traditions of the region’s inhabitants.52 Like previous foreign powers who had ruled 
Palestine, the British accepted the urban elite as the representatives of the Palestinian 
people, strengthening the powerful urban families by giving them positions of 
responsibility on representative councils and official civil and religious posts. By the 
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1920s, the most prominent of these were the Husaynis and the Nashishibis, who had 
come to dominate Jerusalemite politics and occupied the most important Arab positions, 
such as the city’s mayor and the Grand Mufti, responsible for overseeing the city’s many 
religious endowments.53 These two families also quickly dominated the regional parties 
and coalitions that arose during the 1920s and 1930s.54 The first such body, a 24-member 
council formed by the Palestinian Arab Congress in 1920, was quickly dominated by the 
Husaynis. This control over the new Palestinian political environment was buttressed 
when Hajj Amin Husayni was made Grand Mufti and head of the Supreme Muslim 
Council.55 In an effort to offset the Husaynis’ political dominance, Raghib al-Nashashibi, 
head of the Nashashibi clan, formed the National Muslim Societies. These two 
organizations formed the core of Palestinian politics until the 1940s, and the early 
factionalism they demonstrated would remain the rule in the Palestinian national struggle 
until the Arab defeat in 1948.56  
PEASANT VIOLENCE OF THE MANDATE 
Peasant violence increased during the Mandate in response to both the British 
occupation and increasing Arab anger over the growing Zionist presence in Palestine, 
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who by 1931 had increased to 174,006.57 These Jews, only half of whom had been born 
in Palestine, were largely concentrated in the urban centers of Jerusalem and Jaffa, where 
they became an important element in the region’s trading and commercial sectors.58 In 
the hinterlands, the Zionists were able to acquire land, largely from Arab landlords. These 
landlords, urban dwellers who had acquired rural estates through manipulation of the 
Ottoman land reforms, sold their holdings to Jewish immigrant, displacing the peasants 
who had worked the land for generations, and leading to a growing number of displaced 
rural Palestinians.59 Peasant resistance against British occupation began almost 
immediately, and the early years of the occupation experienced a series of violent 
disturbances, most of which began in the urban areas, then spreading to the countryside. 
In the 1930s, Palestinian unrest shifted to focus on the countryside, culminating in the 
Palestinian Revolt of 1936-39.  
The first major incidents after the beginning of the British occupation of Palestine 
occurred in the spring of 1920. After a minor conflict over land in northern Galilee in 
March of that year, increasing anger among Jerusalemite Arabs over the Balfour 
Declaration erupted into rioting and attacks against Jews in Jerusalem’s Old City in April. 
The violence remained contained and was condemned by the Palestinian political leaders 
as being counterproductive in their attempts to gain influence with the British 
administrators. The following year, in Jaffa, police attempting to quiet a disturbance 
between Jewish labor factions triggered Arab rioting and attacks against Jewish business 
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and pedestrians, which quickly spread to the countryside. By the second day of the 
rioting, 40 Jews had been killed. Over the next five days, the violence spread to the 
surrounding villages, as rumors of Jewish reprisal attacks touched off successive waves 
of renewed fighting. In Nablus, for instance, an assembly of three thousand Arab peasants 
and Bedouin in Nablus was only prevented from moving in defense of nearby Tulkarm, 
reportedly under Jewish attack, by the intervention of local notables. In other towns, such 
as Ramlah and Jerusalem, local elites such as al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni and the Jerusalem 
mayor Raghib al-Nashashibi were able to prevent violent demonstrations.  
In August 1929, large-scale peasant violence again broke out, stemming from a 
confessional conflict in Jerusalem, but rapidly spreading outside the city to the rural 
community. An important religious site to both Jews and Muslims, during the mandate 
period, the Wailing Wall became a heated political issue as Jews sought to expand their 
rights at the site, and Muslims, led by al-Hajj Amin al-Hussayni, sought to prevent 
Jewish control of the site. On 21 August, 1929, following the destruction of Jewish 
religious paraphernalia at the sight during the week prior, attendees of a Jewish funeral 
staged a protest against the British government and the Arabs, which was followed by 
additional provocative behavior by both factions. After an inflammatory speech by a rival 
of al-Hajj Amin during Friday prayers on 23 August, enraged congregates moved to the 
Jewish quarter and began attacking residents at random.  As the fighting moved to the 
countryside, peasants destroyed four Jewish settlements, and attacked others, but were 
rebutted by the Jewish defenders. In Hebron, sixty Jewish residents were killed, and in 
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Safad, whose Jewish population predated Zionist immigration, Arab rebels killed 
twenty.60  
The Wailing Wall incident signaled a change in the nature of resistance violence 
in Palestine. Beyond the geographical spread of the conflict to areas previously not 
involved in the sectarian violence, such as Safad, there were serious political 
ramifications, as well. Despite a condemnation of the attacks issued by the Arab 
Executive and endorsed by al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni, indicated to the British that the 
Arabs were not capable of self-government and to the Jews that political resolution with 
the Arab Palestinians was impossible. On the other hand, the outbreak demonstrated the 
volatility of the Palestinian masses as well as their “revolutionary potential.”61 A further 
significant outcome is the increase, after 1929, of grassroots organization within the 
Palestinian population.  
In the period from 1929 to 1935, numerous resistance groups formed in both 
urban and rural Palestine. In the cities, local political committees formed to organize the 
urban population. These organizations, local chapters of the national committee under the 
leadership of al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni, attempted to direct the political activity of the 
urban masses. In the countryside, numerous armed gangs and guerrilla groups formed 
throughout Palestine, under the leadership of various shuyukh and warlords who 
infiltrated Palestine from Syria and Iraq. These bands engaged in assorted acts of 
robbery, harassment, and low-grade terrorism throughout the early 1930s. While the 
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activity of these groups did amount to a growing insurgency, their activity was of only 
minor regional significance until 1935 and the death of Sheikh Izz al-Din al-Qassam. 
In the 1920s, Sheikh Izz al-Din al-Qassam, an Azharite scholar and influential 
leader in the Islamic community of Haifa, began establishing secret guerrilla cells, which 
conducted reconnaissance operations and small attacks in the area throughout the decade. 
Preaching self-sufficiency, humility, courage, and the willingness to sacrifice for the 
cause, al-Qassam had undertaken an Islamic revival in his hometown of Jebla, in 
southern Syria, during the last decade of the Ottoman Empire, and attempted to lead a 
jihad against the Italian occupation of Tripoli in 1912, only to be turned back in 
Alexandria.62 After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, al-Qassam formed a militia to 
defend Jebla against Alawite gangs and French forces consolidating control over the area. 
In 1920, al-Qassam fled Syria, settling in Haifa where he taught at the Madrasa Islamiya, 
became president of the Young Men’s Muslim Association, and held a variety of 
religious positions in the community. In Haifa, al-Qassam attracted a following among 
the rapidly growing urban poor, many of whom had been dispossessed of their land by 
Zionist settlers. Al-Qassam provided them education, using the Quran as his textbook, 
emphasizing the importance of social values and martyrdom. Despite being arrested by 
the British for publicly preaching jihad, during the 1920s, Al-Qassam was able to build a 
cellular group of mujahidin, numbering between 50 and 200, concentrated in northern 
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Palestine.63 In November 1935, al-Qassam decided the time was ripe for revolt against 
the British, and approached al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni for support. Despite being rejected 
by al-Hajj Amin, who believed that such action would alienate the British government 
while providing no gain, al-Qassam  goes forward with his plan, but is killed near Jenin 
before initiating conducting any attacks. 
Despite the lack of substantive gains created by his movement, thousands of 
mourners attended al-Qassam’s funeral and he immediately become an icon for the 
Palestinian resistance against the British and Zionists. The following April, surviving 
members of his band killed two Jews in the course of a robbery, to which the Jewish 
community near Tel Aviv responded by attacking Arabs, including killing several 
workers near Petah Tiqvah.64 The Arab middle class and merchants of Jaffa instituted a 
strike, which spread through the other Palestinian towns, although Arab peasant 
participation was very small.65  A week later, al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni and several other 
prominent Palestinian leaders gave their support to the strike and formed a body, the 
Higher Arab Committee, to coordinate strikes between towns and attempt negotiations 
with the British. The strike rapidly escalated into violence, which spread rapidly 
throughout Palestine. In the cities, mobs demonstrated and attacked Jewish businesses 
and residential areas, including the destruction of Jewish neighborhoods in Jaffa, 
blocking streets with nails and debris, arson, damaging Jewish businesses, and sniping at 
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police patrols. The police responded in kind, injuring protestors and destroying a quarter 
of Jaffa’s Old City in mid-June.  
The urban hostility of the strike quickly spread to the rural areas, where the 
violence became much more widespread. Starting in May, guerrilla bands began to form 
in the hills around the country. In June, they had their first engagement with British 
troops, when sixty Arabs from Nablus ambushed a military convoy. Other guerrilla bands 
formed, by September numbering between one and two thousand, including 300 foreign 
fighters led by Syrian exile Fawzi al-Quaqji.66 The guerrillas conducted attacks against 
police and military patrols and targeted Jewish settlements, destroying crops, uprooting 
trees, and sniping at communities from the hills. The gangs also staged attacks against 
infrastructure, including derailing trains and cutting telephone and telegraph lines. In 
response to the Arab guerrillas, the British fielded 20,000 troops, augmented by Royal 
Air Force spotting aircraft.  
As the economic impact of the strike on Palestinian Arabs increased, conflict over 
the strike grew within the urban communities, resulting in the assassination of the Haifa 
committee president, forcing the Higher Arab Committee to request assistance from the 
kings of Egypt, Transjordan, and Iraq, who intervened with the British to open 
negotiations. The Higher Arab Committee ended the strike in mid-October, without 
obtaining any political concessions from the British. The Palestinian guerrillas melted 
back into the population and in late November the British allowed the foreign militants to 
slip across the border out of Palestine and into Syria.  
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Over the winter and spring of 1937, the conflict smoldered, with periodic 
incidents of violence. Throughout the year there were sporadic attacks against the Jewish 
population, and against Palestinians viewed as being unsupportive or insufficiently 
supportive of the guerrillas. In July 1937, another wave of violence followed the 
announcement by the British of a plan to partition the territory into Arab and Zionist 
areas, and in September, the latent insurgency reached a climax when the British district 
commissioner for Galilee was assassinated. As the highest ranking British official killed 
in the conflict, the British viewed the attack as a challenge to their authority in the region 
and responded by rounding up political activists throughout the district and by banning 
the Higher Arab Committee. Two weeks later, violence erupted again in earnest. 
Guerrilla bands quickly formed in the hills across Palestine, particularly in the 
northern and southern mountains around Hebron. Early attacks resembled those of 1936, 
including sniper attacks, cutting telephone and telegraph wires, and destroying crops, but 
by March the violence had outstripped that of the earlier revolt. From October 1936 until 
the summer of 1937, the guerrillas, who the British had allowed to remain at large after 
the end of the strike, had been able to develop their tactics and organization.67 In March 
1938, between three and four hundred guerrillas faced two thousand British soldiers and 
police near Umm al-Fahum, suffering heavy casualties. Guerrillas in the central towns of 
Ramallah, Beersheba, and Gaza conducted raids of banks and government offices to 
obtain funds and additional weapons and ammunition. 
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In his analysis of the 1936-1939 revolt, Tom Bowden observes that Palestinian 
guerrilla groups formed in a fairly consistent pattern.68 Typically, groups began as small, 
poorly-organized bands, composed of individuals affiliated by their common local origin. 
Armed with knives, clubs, and a few firearms—from WWI, or older—these gangs 
generally limited their activity to robbery and minor acts of terrorism. While militarily 
weak, their mobility and small footprint enabled them to avoid capture, attracting more 
followers.69 As groups gained strength and notoriety through continued successful 
operations, often several groups would combine together into a single larger group, 
which, though able to achieve more decisive results in battle, were also easier for the 
British forces to track and engage. 
Bowden further distinguishes between the urban and the rural as two distinct 
categories of resistance in the revolt. While the revolt initially consisted of both 
intellectual, or political, and operative components—the intellectual being almost 
exclusively in the urban milieu—as the revolt progressed after 1936, the men of violence 
came to dominate the revolt in both the urban and rural environments.70 Across the 
region, guerrilla gangs dominated towns and villages, and even portions of the major 
cities, including Jaffa and Jerusalem, which was under the control of the rebels for 
several months. 
In October 1937, the British transferred troops from Europe to supplement its 
existing forces and began deliberate clearing and counterguerrilla operations. Over the 
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next several months, the British recaptured Jerusalem and other major towns and restored 
damaged transportation and communication infrastructure. Through collective fines and 
punitive measures, the British pressured villages to halt their assistance of the guerrillas, 
eroding the guerrillas’ support base. As conditions became progressively more austere for 
the gangs, they increasingly resorted to extortion and force to acquire provisions from the 
rural population, further alienating their peasant sponsors. 
Throughout the revolt, the violence of peasant groups retained a distinctly 
traditional character, in many ways more similar to the tribally-oriented conflict of 
nineteenth century Ottoman Syria than peasant revolutions of the early twentieth century. 
As we have already seen, the basic foundation of gang formation consisted of individuals 
acquainted through local affiliation, and bands were organized under the leadership of 
strong individuals. Both of these features are modern reflections of traditional peasant 
martial organization. While the guerrillas of the 1930s became more mobile than their 
earlier forebears, they were nonetheless still tied to their villages and communities in the 
countryside for shelter and material support.  
Of perhaps greater significance than its mechanical similarity to rural conflict in 
Palestine prior to and during the nineteenth century, the peasant violence of the 1936-39 
revolt also maintained significant tactical and ideological similarities to traditional 
peasant resistance, but with clear evidence of the influence of the socio-political changes 
experienced by the population over the previous century. Palestinian guerrillas during the 
revolt relied heavily upon hit-and-run tactics, utilizing the rugged, hilly terrain to offset 
the numerical and technological advantages of the British military and police forces, just 
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as their predecessors had against Ottoman and Egyptian troops in previous battles. 
Similarly, rural insurgents exploited their connection with, and ability to blend into the 
village population for both sustainment, and to avoid capture by their enemies and –
during periods of calm—were able to return to village life. At times, for instance during 
the general strike of 1936, the peasants would temporarily abandon martial activities in 
order to complete critical agricultural tasks in season, such as time-sensitive planting or 
harvesting. 
 Despite the vestiges of patterns of earlier peasant resistance still apparent in 
mandatory Palestine, the socio-political changes that had occurred in Palestinian society 
by 1936 fundamentally affected the strategy of martial activity in the region. The 
farthest-reaching effect of this is the void created between those who wielded political 
authority and those who conducted the various acts of violent resistance as the seat of 
authority shifted from the rural shuyukh to the urban a’yan. Despite the dominance of the 
a’yan over negotiations with the British, the rural shuyukh maintained significant 
influence over the village populations. During the various activities of 1936-1939, this 
resulted in parallel sets of uncoordinated operations. As the urban leaders, led by the 
political elite of Jerusalem, attempted to conduct negotiations with the mandatory 
authorities, rural militias conducted raids and assassinations with no political objective 
or, with the exception of the Islamic jihad of Sheikh Izz al-Din al-Qassam, no theoretical 
basis to guide their actions. Beyond being simply absent of political strategy or theory, 
the peasant violence of the mandatory period evidenced strong intergroup rivalry and 
competition reminiscent of the tribal violence of the Qays and Yaman coalitions. For 
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example, in addition to harassing British patrols, the Abu Dura and Zuumi families of 
northern Palestine attacked each other’s villages.71A number of Palestinians, including 
the president of the Haifa strike, mentioned previously, and many of al-Hajj Amin al-
Husayni’s political opponents,72 fell victim to assassination by the rebels alongside 
British administrators such as the district commissioner for Galilee and the acting district 
commissioner of Jenin in the summer of 1938. In fact, according to Bowden, the number 
of Arab killed by Arabs during the revolt, 494, was almost equal to the number of Jews 
killed by Arabs, 547.73 Rather than limited warfare to create a favorable position from 
which to conduct negotiations, the violence—both rural and urban—was uncontrolled 
and aimless. The directionless, self-interested, character that predominated in the activity 
of the guerrillas further illustrates the effects of the lack of strong political networks 
between those who had come to wield political influence in the urban environment and 
those who still commanded social and familial influence in the rural environment. 
Ultimately, this gap prevented either group from achieving any political accommodation 
from the British. The urban politicians, while able to direct the activity of the urban 
masses to a degree, were unable to influence the much more widespread resistance 
outside of the cities to support their negotiations with the British. Likewise, the rural 
peasants, frustrated by social and economic conditions in the countryside, were unable to 
find a politically-influential mouthpiece through which to voice their interests.  
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CONCLUSION 
As the revolt lost momentum in late 1938 and the British counterguerrilla 
campaign continued to place pressure on those rebels still operating, gradually 
recapturing territory and causing many of the leaders to flee Palestine for Damascus. In 
the spring of 1939, the British published a White Paper that limited Jewish migration and 
the sale of Arab lands to Jews, and committing to the independence of the region as a 
jointly Jewish-Arab governed state within ten-years’ time, which met with vehement 
rejection by both the Palestinian Arabs and the Zionists. The ability of the Palestinian 
Arabs to influence the British politically had been severely reduced by the hostilities of 
1935-1939.74 In addition to the damage caused to the indigenous political elite by 
numerous assassinations and the exile of al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni, who continued to 
attempt to conduct negotiations on behalf of Palestine during his exile, the entrance of the 
non-Palestinian Arab monarchs of Egypt, Iraq, and Transjordan during the General Strike 
of 1936 initiated a new phase in the ongoing contestation over the region.75 While the 
Grand Mufti sought to gain support of the Axis powers for a post-war Arab Palestine, in 
fear of losing its Middle Eastern allies, Britain moved closer to the Arab states. 
Throughout the remainder of the 1940s, the Palestinians increasingly relied on their 
neighbor states to rescue them from the threat of the Zionists, first for their influence with 
the British, then, after the creation of the Arab league and the end of the war, for a 
military solution. While the Yishuv continued to organize itself politically and develop 
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itself militarily throughout the 1940s, the Palestinians failed to overcome their established 
social divisions. Thus, in 1948, when the Arab states were defeated as they attempted to 
prevent the creation of the Israeli state, the Palestinians were left without a champion 




Chapter 2 – The Formation of Political Ideology in the Palestinian 
Resistance between 1948 and 1967 
From the perspective of the generation of Palestinians who coming of age in the 
period immediately surrounding the nakba, the loss of Palestine to Israel necessitated an 
intellectual reformulation and the development of new historical narratives of the period 
leading up to 1948. The intellectual approach taken by these young Palestinians, most of 
whom were engaged in university studies or in late adolescence in 1948, can be broadly 
grouped into two trends. The first, exemplified by Yasir Arafat and al-Fatah, rejected the 
system of notable politics that dominated Arab Palestinian politics prior to 1948 and 
proposed violent struggle, primarily in the form of guerrilla warfare, without the 
patronage of any of the Arab states—which they believed wanted to weaken and control 
the resistance movement to suit their own ends. The second camp, typified most notably 
in the 1950s and 1960s by George Habash and the Arab Nationalist Movement, also 
called for guerrilla opposition to Israel, but believed that the liberation of Palestine could 
only be accomplished by first establishing pan-Arab unity. Prior to 1967, this camp 
subordinated its call for violent action to efforts to foster for pan-Arab unity, primarily 
under the banner of Egyptian President Gamal Abd al-Nasser.  
This chapter will examine the political development of the Palestinian resistance 
between 1948 and 1967. I will first discuss the political projects of the generation of 
Palestinians who exercised political authority immediately prior to the nakba, most 
notably Mohammed Hajj Amin al-Husayni. For these pre-1948 Palestinian political elite, 
the Israeli victory did not demand a fundamental reevaluation of the traditional political 
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structure, but rather the development of ties to stronger and more influential patrons, 
found in the form of the Arab states. I will then define the generation of Palestinians who 
rose to positions of political prominence in the following two decades and discuss the 
similarities in their backgrounds, demography and education, which contributed to a 
similar sociopolitical outlook within the group and a shared historical narrative of the 
nakba. Finally, I will discuss the ideological development of the two major divisions of 
the group, characterized by the Arab Nationalist Movement and Fatah during the 1950s 
and 1960s, leading up to the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war. While Fatah remained 
relatively constant in its core beliefs during this period, throughout the 1960s, the ANM 
experienced increasing conflict within its ranks over the priority given the liberation of 
Palestine, which ultimately would cause it to fracture and to seek a new theoretical 
foundation after 1967. 
CONTINUITY OF PALESTINIAN POLITICAL STRUCTURES AFTER 1948 
The transformation of Palestinian society in 1948 abruptly ended traditional 
political networks and generations-old patronage relationships among the Arab 
population, as thousands left their homes to become refugees, both elsewhere within the 
region and abroad. While Rosemary Sayigh notes that many of the existing social 
hierarchies remained intact in the refugee camps as groups tended to relocate together,76 
the nakba disrupted normal generational political turnover. Rather than the usual 
trajectory, by which young adults enter the local economic and political institutions of 
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society, over time replacing the preceding generation, the nakba had the effect of 
preserving the influence of a small number of Palestinian leaders while simultaneously 
obliterating the aspirations and expectations of a generation of young adults.  
The older generation, those Arab Palestinians who occupied positions of political 
and social authority prior to 1948, was fully a product of the political structure of 
Palestine, which—as noted in the previous chapter—was based on a variety of patronage 
networks, and closely tied to family-oriented social hierarchies. For the few members of 
this group who retained influence subsequent to 1948, the same notions of power and 
authority remained salient and the pre-1948 Palestinian political structure was not held to 
blame for the Israeli victory. Rather, as the case of Mohammed Hajj Amin al-Husayni 
shows, these individuals attempted to maintain their influence in Palestinian politics 
through relationships with the Arab states, each of which sought to manipulate the 
situation to serve its own strategic ends.77 Hajj Amin’s case serves as a particularly 
telling example of this group’s efforts to resurrect traditional authority relationships in 
response to the post-1948 political realities in the region. From 1948 until the formation 
of the PLO in 1963, which effectively ended his political career, Hajj Amin consistently 
opposed any political body proposed which might threaten his role as champion of 
Palestinian nationalism.78 During this period, he alternately sought to build favorable 
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relations with the rulers of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq, playing regional rivalries off 
one another in order to find official backing for his leadership of the Palestinians. Starting 
in 1960, he even began to attempt reconciliation with his long-time foe King Husayn of 
Transjordan, as both opposed the Arab League’s proposed creation of a Palestinian entity 
in the West Bank.79 His failure to prevent the establishment of the PLO, from which he 
was subsequently excluded, led him afterward to ally with Fatah, which shared his 
distrust of Egyptian President Gamal Abd al-Nasser, but also signaled the beginning of 
his ultimate political decline,80 as Ahmed Shukairy was selected as the PLO’s chairman. 
While not a political elite of Hajj Amin’s caste prior to the nakba, Shukairy—who 
not only chaired the PLO from its creation until his resignation following the 1967 Arab-
Israeli War, but also played a major role in its creation, represents the traditional upper- 
and middle-classes of pre-1948 Palestine. An influential lawyer in Palestine during the 
Mandate, Shukairy was born in 1908 to a Turkish mother and Arab father—who was 
active in the politics of the late Ottoman Empire. In 1948 he briefly held a position in the 
All-Palestine Government, before evacuating to Beirut. Between 1948 and 1964, 
Shukairy held a variety of political appointments in several of the Arab states. During the 
following decade-and-a-half, he held positions of Syrian delegate to the United Nations, 
the Assistant Secretary General for the Arab League, and a variety of other appointments. 
Additionally, he was legal counsel and minister for UN affairs for Saudi Arabic from 
1957 until 1963, when he lost the favor of Saudi foreign minister and crown prince 
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Faisal.81 At Nasser’s request, Shukairy was appointed as the Palestinian representative to 
the Arab League in 1963, when the standing delegate died.82 Following this appointment, 
he undertook an aggressive campaign among the Arab heads of state for the creation of a 
Palestinian national organization, which came to fruition in 1964 in the form of the PLO. 
While of distinctly different backgrounds and biographies, Hajj Amin al-Husayni 
and Ahmed Shukairy represent two elements of the same political reality. Both products 
of the traditional Palestinian political milieu, in the years after 1948 (and in the case of 
Hajj Amin, the years leading up to the nakba, as well) each sought to further both the 
cause of the Palestinian people and his own political aspirations through political ties to 
the leaders of the Arab states, which in effect replaced the traditional patronage networks 
of Ottoman Palestine. In much the same way that earlier generations of Palestinian tribal 
elites switched allegiance as benefitted the current conditions, the political elite of the 
post-nakba period exploited Arab Cold War politics and national rivalries.  
THE NEXT GENERATION OF PALESTINIAN POLITICAL ACTORS 
In stark contrast to this group stands the generation of Palestinians who rose to 
prominence through the Palestinian resistance movement between 1948 and 1967. In 
young adulthood or late adolescence in 1948, these individuals had expectations for their 
live and futures, which events of the nakba abruptly ended. Additionally, as youngsters 
just entering adult society, the members of this group lacked political connections to 
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influential Arab leaders, and so were unable to engage in the same patterns of Palestinian 
politics as the preceding generation. Rather, the members of this generation were led in a 
dramatically different direction than that taken by the Palestinian notables of the 
traditional model. Supported by the historical narratives that they created, largely based 
on their experiences in 1948 and afterward, their outlook informed the methods that they 
used as they sought to bring the Palestinian issue to the attention of the global public and 
to liberate the Palestinian territories from Israeli occupation. By and large, the options 
identified by this group favored the use of guerrilla violence and terrorist attacks in 
support of achieving their political aims. Following the nakba, an untold number of these 
organizations operated with varying degrees of support from the Arab states For the 
purpose of the current study, we can divide this generation between 1948 and 1967 into 
two broad “camps.” In terms of their ideology, the camps are distinguished by the 
importance they assigned to pan-Arab unity in recapturing Palestine from Israel. In more 
practical terms, however, they can be differentiated by the degree to which they were 
willing to ally themselves with the Arab states. The first group, that of the independent 
operators, is best characterized by Yasir Arafat and his compatriots in the Fatah guerrilla 
organization. Highly critical of the motives of the Arab heads of state and the role that 
they played in the 1948 defeat, they held that the liberation of Palestine must be achieved 
by Palestinians and that the movement must remain independent from the control of the 
Arab states. The second, which we can call the pan-Arabists, is best represented by 
George Habash and the Arab Nationalist Movement. Although initially suspicious of the 
Arab regimes, this group believed that the failure in 1948 was due to the lack of unity 
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among Arabs, and that Palestine could not effectively be restored without first achieving 
pan-Arab unity.83 
Demographic Similarity 
The members of this generation who rose to prominence shared remarkably 
similar socioeconomic and educational backgrounds. For the most part, they hailed from 
Palestine’s growing middle class, merchantry, and low-level bureaucracy and some 
hailed from influential Palestinian families. Most earned at least basic university degrees 
and many earned graduate or medical degrees. Most of the founders of the ANM, for 
example, met through student organizations at American University of Beirut.84 Habash, 
whose family owned a store, described his family as “fairly well off.”85 After moving 
with his family from Lydda to Jaffa when he was thirteen, he attended the Greek 
Orthodox secondary school there and another in Jerusalem. He then attended American 
University of Beirut for both an undergraduate degree and medical school.86 Other of his 
AUB colleagues and ANM co-founders included Wadi Haddad (also of a middle-class 
Christian background), and Ahmad al-Khatib, from Kuwait.87 Through their involvement 
in various student groups at AUB, these individuals made contacts and identified 
potential recruits.  
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Although born and raised in Cairo, Yasser Arafat’s parents both came from 
among prominent Jerusalemite families. His father, a food and goods wholesaler, was 
related to Hajj Amin al-Husayni. Arafat’s mother, who died when he was four years old, 
was a member of the Abu Saud family, one of Jerusalem’s oldest and most respected, 
which claimed direct lineage to the Prophet Mohammed.88 After secondary school, Arafat 
attended King Fuad University, where he studied engineering and, like his AMN 
counterparts was active in a number of student political organizations and clubs. 
Likewise, many of his counterparts hailed from similar backgrounds. Fatah co-founder 
Salah Khalaf (better known by his nom de guerre “Abu Iyad”), whose father was 
employed by the surveyor’s office and later owned a shop in Carmel,89 fled from Jaffa to 
Gaza with his family in May 1948. From Gaza, he moved to Cairo in 1951, where he 
attended Dar al-Ulum and was active in several Palestinian student political 
organizations. The al-Hasan brothers, Khalid (a Fatah founding member) and his 
younger brother, Hani, had a similar background prior to their family’s exodus from 
Haifa following the Deir Yassin massacre. The al-Hasan’s father, who died when the 
elder brother was thirteen, was a respected religious leader in the local community.90 
Both al-Hasan brothers studied engineering, Hani in West Germany, where he recruited 
guerrillas and raised funds through involvement in student organizations.91  
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Economic Prospects 
Despite the difficulty that many Palestinian refugees had in finding employment 
in their new homes, as a group, these individuals were remarkably successful at finding 
employment, particularly in Kuwait and the other Gulf States. The expansion of middle 
class employment opportunities in the rapidly growing oil economies, combined with 
sympathy there toward the Palestinian cause, benefitted the immigrants. Khalil al-Wazir 
(commonly known as “Abu Jihad”), another of Fatah’s co-founders, and Salah Khalaf 
were school teachers.92 Yasir Arafat was an engineer at the Kuwaiti Ministry of Public 
Works.93 Several, including Khaled al-Hasan,94 and Mahmoud Abbas, later chairman of 
the Palestinian Liberation Organization, held influential bureaucratic positions, which 
they used to raise funds for the movement and secure employment and visas for other 
Palestinians.95 Already active in establishing the ANM at the time of his graduation from 
medical school, Habash immigrated to Amman to set up a medical clinic and literacy 
school. Ahmad al-Khatib, one of the few non-Palestinians in the group, returned to 
Kuwait, where he also began a medical practice.96 
Experiences with the Muslim Brotherhood 
A further distinguishing feature of this group is its widespread involvement in the 
Muslim Brotherhood, particularly among the founders of Fatah. Arafat fought in 
Palestine in 1948 with a contingent of the Muslim Brotherhood from Cairo, and in the 
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early 1950s helped train university students. Al-Wazir joined the Brotherhood in 1951, 
but left soon after to found his own organization.97 The al-Hasan brothers were both 
affiliated with the Syrian branch. There were notable exceptions, however. Naturally, 
Christian Palestinians, like Habash and Haddad, were not members. Although he came 
from a strong Muslim background, Salah Khalaf stated that, while he respected the 
Brotherhood’s efforts and sacrifices, he found their ideology “foreign” and himself drawn 
“toward a secular nationalism.”98  
THE FORMULATION OF A NEW POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Reaction to Experiences during the Nakba 
The socioeconomic similarity in the backgrounds of these young Arabs was 
critical in forming a shared outlook among this generation of Palestinians, but beyond the 
demographic similarities between these individuals, each also experienced the nakba 
firsthand, albeit in a variety of ways. Some, like Yasir Arafat and George Habash 
returned to Palestine from elsewhere to take part in the fighting and help others evacuate. 
As already mentioned, Arafat fought against the Israelis with the Muslim Brotherhood. 
George Habash returned from Beirut to help in the Lydda hospital before the death of his 
sister and his family’s expulsion from the city by Jewish soldiers. After helping them to 
evacuate to Ramallah he returned to Beirut to continue his medical studies.99 The 
majority, however—especially those who were still teenagers at the time—were among 
those Palestinians who fled their homes as the Jewish lines advanced and the armies of 
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the Arab states withdrew. Many, such as Salah Khalaf, evacuated after hearing reports of 
the mass killing of the residents of Deir Yassin—in fear of another such event if they 
were captured by the Israeli forces.100 Al-Wazir’s family was forced to leave Ramleh 
after it was captured by the Israelis.101  
In the wake of the Arab defeat, the new Palestinian refugees, dismayed by the 
traumatic events of the nakba and the defeat of the Arab states, sought to understand what 
had happened. To the young Palestinians, the creation of Israel and the subsequent 
exodus essentially ended life as they knew it. To attempt to understand, and to come to 
terms with, this trauma required analysis and the creation of a narrative capable of 
explaining the events and postulating a method to restore pre-1948 Palestine. For the 
future leaders of al-Fatah and the ANM, their experiences during the nakba formed the 
basis of their historical and political analyses and the narratives they developed 
afterward, but they also looked to a variety of other sources for ideological inspiration 
and guidance. Frantz Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth was among the most influential 
works consumed by the founders of Fatah and informed their concept of revolutionary 
violence.102 Salah Khalaf read widely on other revolutionary and nationalist movements 
including the writing of Michel Aflaq, Lenin, and Mao Zedong and followed news of the 
National Liberation Front in Algeria.103 The writings of Arab nationalists Constantine 
Zurayk and Sati’ al-Husri inspired Habash and his fellows and led them to decide that the 
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liberation of Palestine could not be achieved without first attaining Arab unity.104 In 
addition to the work of Arab nationalist theorists, the group sought inspiration from the 
history of other nationalist movements and the French Revolution. Habash and Haddad 
studied the Quran, despite their Christian backgrounds.  
The Importance of Armed Struggle  
Both groups were drawn to armed resistance and guerrilla activity against Israel. 
Following his return to Beirut from Lydda in the summer of 1948, Habash, with Wadi’ 
Haddad and several other AUB students, began organizing for political and military 
activity. They soon formed their first guerrilla organization, the Kata’ib al-Fida al-
‘Arabi, which was active from 1948 to 1951. After an unsuccessful attempt by a faction 
of the group to assassinate Syrian president Adib al-Shishakli, however, Habash and the 
organization’s other core members determined the need for greater organization in their 
efforts. In 1951, the core activists formed the Arab Nationalist Movement, based on the 
fundamental idea that “Palestine could not be liberated unless the Arab countries were 
fully freed from colonial control and thus able to concentrate their resources against 
Israel.” Following from this, the ANM believed that all efforts should be focused on 
bringing about change in the Arab governments, which were tainted by their ties to 
Western imperialism.105  
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Palestinians’ Analysis of the Role of the Arab States in the Loss of Palestine 
This criticism of the Arab states was common among the Palestinian militants, 
who felt that the political ambitions of the Arab heads of state, particularly Kings 
Abdullah of Transjordan and Farouq of Egypt, led them to sacrifice the Palestinians for 
the sake of territorial acquisition. Initially Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Iraq—all were implicated 
in the loss of Palestine and, by 1951, all the leaders who had negotiated for armistice with 
Israel had been assassinated.106 Additionally, following their defeat by Israel in 1948, all 
of these countries experienced at least one period of regime change, typically violent, 
within the next decade.  
The founders of al-Fatah shared this criticism of the Arab states, but felt that 
primacy must be given to the liberation of Palestine. They felt that pan-Arab unity would 
be achieved through the liberation of Palestine, not the reverse. They criticized the Arab 
states’ participation in the 1948 war for excluding the participation of Palestinian forces, 
and dismantling the nationalist movement.107 They felt that the Palestinians “could expect 
nothing” from the Arab states; for any Palestinian movement to be successful, it would 
have to remain independent and operate without the support of any Arab regime.108 
The 1952 Egyptian Revolution changed the political landscape and began a 
process of reorientation within the resistance movement, which viewed the new regime 
with mixed feelings. While the Palestinians of both camps were initially skeptical of the 
Free Officers, many were impressed by Nasser’s opposition to the Baghdad Pact in 1955 
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and his anti-Western position. His move to nationalize the Suez Canal in 1956 and his 
resistance to the tripartite invasion that followed persuaded the ANM to align itself with 
his pan-Arab policy.109 While the militants of the Fatah camp were also impressed by 
Nasser’s anti-Western stance and the potential support of his regime, they refused to 
compromise their independence and freedom of maneuver by being tied to closely to any 
of the Arab states.110 
During the late 1950s, as Nasser’s popularity grew with his increasingly anti-
western stance, the ANM became increasingly tied to Egypt and conducted a variety of 
operations in support of Egyptian objectives. Backed by Egyptian military and 
intelligence support, ANM cells located in Egypt and Jordan conducted small-scale 
attacks against Israeli targets. After the failure of the nationalist government in Jordan in 
1957, members of the ANM also engaged in a protracted guerrilla campaign against the 
Jordanian government, again with the aid of Egypt, which led to their expulsion from the 
country in 1960.111 The strengthening ties between the ANM and Nasser reinforced its 
belief in the primacy of Arab unity as a precondition for the liberation of Palestine.112 
The breakup of the United Arab Republic in 1961 signaled the beginning of a 
period of ideological strain and factionalism within the ANM, tied to its emphasis on 
pan-Arab unity over Palestinian liberation. In response to the concerns of a number of 
Palestinians within the movement, a “Palestine Committee” had been formed in 1959 
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with a structure roughly parallel to the movement’s existing structure. As the Palestinians 
watched events in Algeria and Yemen in 1962, however, some elements found it 
increasingly irksome to subordinate the liberation of Palestine to Nasser’s political 
programme.113 It was not until 1964 that any structural changes reflecting this ideological 
debate took place. Due to increased discord between factions within the movement, the 
Palestinian Committee officially split from the main organization of the ANM to form a 
Palestinian “command” (although still under the control of the ANM executive 
committee). Despite revealing a shift toward a greater emphasis on the liberation of 
Palestine, the formation of a Palestinian command by the ANM did not simultaneously 
signal a move toward an escalation of the armed resistance, and the ANM executive 
committee, under Habash, remained committed to avoiding a premature confrontation 
with Israel, which would jeopardize Nasser’s plans.114 Because of its role as an official 
body tasked with actively advancing the Palestinian cause, the creation of the Palestine 
Liberation Organization in 1964 increased the pressure within the ANM to initiate 
guerrilla attacks against Israel. Although it reconfirmed its commitment to delaying 
military action soon after, in late 1964 the group’s leadership permitted a mission from 
Lebanon into Galilee, which was intercepted by Israeli soldiers and resulted in the death 
of one militant, Khalid al-Hajj.115 
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ANM VIEW OF ARMED STRUGGLE, 1965 – 1967   
The announcement in January 1965 of Fatah’s armed campaign against Israel 
further increased the difficulty of the ANM to maintain its restraint. As Fatah continued 
its attacks against Israel, it was increasingly critical of the ANM’s refusal to commitment 
to armed struggle. A war of words ensued in the organizations’ newspapers. Through its 
official mouthpiece, Fatah criticized the ANM’s refusal to engage in guerrilla action 
against Israel. The ANM responded in support of the Nasserist line of action through its 
existing weekly, al-Hurriyah, as also created a new series entitled Filastin, which was 
supplement to the Beiruti al-Muhurrir newspaper.  
Nevertheless, as Arab opposition to Israel grew more heated throughout the mid-
1960s, the ANM faced increasing internal and external pressure to increase its military 
activity. In response to increased pressure, the ANM created two front organizations 
tasked with conducting attacks against Israel, including the “Heroes of the Return,” 
which was a joint endeavor between the ANM and the PLO. Despite the creation of these 
groups, which conducted periodic attacks inside Israel in the period leading up to June 
1967, in general, the ANM maintained its position of restraint in favor of Nasser’s 
timeline. This became easier after Nasser adopted a policy of escalation in mid-1966, 
which eventually led to the June 1967 war. In May of 1967 the ANM authorized its front 
groups to begin military action against Israel, and finally began to publicize the death of 
Khalid al-Hajj, which had occurred over two years prior, on June 5, 1967—the day the 
war broke out.116 
                                                 
116 Ibid.: 627. 
 53 
CONCLUSION 
For both of these groups of Palestinians, the Six-Day War in June of 1967 served 
as a turning point. For Arafat and Fatah, it marked the beginning of a decline in their 
independence, and what could be viewed as a move into the mainstream, as they took 
control of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, the “official” body representing the 
Palestinians, in 1968. By no means rejecting armed struggle as a legitimate method in the 
resistance movement, nevertheless, they subsequently embarked on a mission to increase 
the international political legitimacy and influence of the Palestinian cause and to develop 
the PLO into something state-like.  
For the militants of the Arab Nationalist Movement and other like-minded groups, 
however, 1967 marked the beginning of a dramatic escalation in the use of violence in the 
name of the Palestinian cause. No longer able to contain its internal ideological conflict 
after the discrediting of Nasserism, following the Six-Day War, the organization 
fractured and many of its constituents undertook major theoretical reorientation. While 
this included a significant increase in the frequency of attacks, more significant is the 
marked diversity of the violent activities of the groups of this camp. After 1968, groups 
formed by splinters of both the ANM and Fatah greatly expanded their geographical 
scope and the types of operations they conducted. This phase of the resistance, 
characterized by an unprecedented internationalism in both the attacks conducted and the 
membership of the organizations involved, expanded beyond the guerrilla warfare which 
had characterized the resistance previously to include attacks against international 
transportation infrastructure, bank robberies, kidnappings, and assassinations—across the 
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Middle East and in Europe. Indeed, this period was characterized by the numerous high-
profile airline hijackings conducted by its members between 1968 and 1976.  
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Chapter 3 – Filasṭīn: A Case Study in the Intellectual Development of 
the Palestinian Resistance, 1965-1967 
Like guerrilla and resistance movements in Europe and the Americas, the 
organizations of the Palestinian resistance movement published numerous journals and 
newspapers. Generally speaking, these mouthpieces advanced the political agenda of the 
organization, sought to undermine the arguments and positions of rival organizations and 
opponents, and—in the case of groups engaged in violent activities—attempted to justify 
the faction’s violent acts.117 In the Palestinian case specifically, these serials also sought 
to define Palestinianism and to construct a Palestinian identity-consciousness—both 
among Palestinians and the Arab population, at large. Like other organizations in the 
Palestinian resistance movement, the Arab Nationalist Movement published several such 
publications, including al-Ra’i, in Kuwait and al-Muharrir, in Beirut—which was the 
most important pro-Nasser daily newspaper outside Egypt.118 Between late 1964 and June 
1, 1967, al-Muharrir released sixty-seven issues of Filasṭīn, a bi-weekly supplement 
focused specifically on Palestine-related issues.119 Filasṭīn shared the objectives of other 
such party mouthpieces, but did so according to a distinctly pan-Arab editorial stance. 
                                                 
117 In addition to the ANM newspapers listed here, another noteworthy Palestinian resistance newspaper 
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Despite mounting internal and external pressure upon the ANM abandon its pan-Arab 
stance and give priority to the liberation of Palestine from Israeli occupation, throughout 
its publication Filasṭīn demonstrated the ANM’s continued support for Egyptian 
president Gamal Abd al-Nasser’s role as the leader in both the Arab world and the 
Palestinian question in both content and tone.   Filasṭīn’s articles consistently advocated a 
pan-Arab solution to the Palestinians’ political situation, supported the efforts and 
authority of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, and discouraged widespread 
Palestinian guerrilla engagement in Israel. In response to the call for immediate armed 
resistance action, such as in al-Fatah’s published statements, Filasṭīn responded 
tentatively—theoretically supporting armed action, but cautioning repeatedly that further 
study was needed, and reminding its readers that the Arab armies were responsible for 
carrying the battle against the Israeli and imperialist forces—when it did come. Not 
limited to political and military concerns, Filasṭīn maintained this perspective in its 
engagements with Palestinian culture, endeavoring to create a greater awareness both of 
the richness of Palestinian culture and the traumatic loss it suffered as a result of the 
nakba. It did so within a distinctly pan-Arab rhetorical and analytical framework. 
In this chapter, I will briefly describe the context and general content of the 
newspaper and its most important staff member—Ghassan Kanafani, a major Palestinian 
political journalist and author. I will then discuss the newspaper’s efforts to engage 
Palestinian Arab collective memory in order to advance a pan-Arab Palestinian identity 
based on the ANM’s interpretation of Palestinian historical and cultural elements. I will 
then discuss the ways in which the newspaper adhered to a pan-Arab political position 
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despite growing internal conflict. I will give particular emphasis to its stance toward 
guerrilla warfare, as this is the area in which it most clearly distinguished its ideology 
from that of the rival camp within the resistance, that of al-Fataḥ.  
GHASSAN KANAFANI 
The newspaper featured contributions from a number of journalists, political 
commentators, artists, and authors, but a significant amount of the periodical’s material 
was produced by its editor-in-chief, Ghassan Kanafani, who—in addition to editing the 
newspaper for much of its publication, contributed numerous articles and works of short 
fiction. Kanafani, known outside the Middle East primarily as a novelist and write of 
short stories, later became the spokesman for the ANM’s successor-group, the Popular 
Front for the Liberation of Palestine and edited the PLFP newspaper al-Hadaf prior to his 
death in 1972 in a car bombing.  
Kanafani shared many of the biographical similarities of the members of his 
political generation. Born in Acre in 1936, his father was a lawyer. Despite his family’s 
Sunni Muslim background, he attended French missionary elementary schools prior to his 
family’s flight from Palestine in 1948, after which they eventually settled in Damascus. 
In the early 1950s Kanafani became active in the Arab Nationalist Movement and played 
and large role in articulating and disseminating its political messages through a variety of 
journalistic and literary endeavors. In addition to the numerous literary works that he 
published prior to his assassination in 1972, Kanafani edited and produced content for 
several ANM-supported and affiliated newspapers during the late 1950s and much of the 
1960s, including al-Ra’i, and al-Hurriyya, also in Beirut. In 1963 Kanafani assumed the 
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role of editor-in-chief of the new ANM newspaper al-Muharrir, which in the fall of 1964 
began publishing Filasṭīn. While numerous individuals contributed to the newspaper’s 
content, through his influence as editor, as well as the many articles and works of short 
fiction he contributed to the periodical, Kanafani left a clear mark on Filasṭīn’s 
content.120 
GENERAL CONTENT AND EDITORIAL PERSPECTIVE 
Each 12-page issue included a variety of content. Every edition included letters 
and short submissions by readers on various topics, as well as a number of political 
illustrations and cartoons. Many issues also included short editorials and opinion-pieces. 
While absent from early issues, within a few months the newspaper began carrying 
advertisements for a variety of businesses and products. The remainder of each edition 
was devoted to journalistic content. In general, an issue would carry two two-page main 
articles and several shorter one- or one-and-a-half-page pieces. 
The newspaper’s content varied from issue to issue, but the bulk of the articles 
throughout its publication fell into several major topical groups. For the purposes of this 
analysis, I categorize the majority of Filasṭīn’s content as being either political, cultural, 
or practical—with the vast majority of Filasṭīn’s articles being focused on either political 
or cultural topics. Within each category, Filasṭīn addressed a wide variety of issues and 
sub-topics. Political concerns addressed in Filasṭīn included the internal politics and 
                                                 
120 Wild, 17-18. Other notable contributors included Saleh Shibl and Burhan (al-)Dajani, who—along with 
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foreign relations of both Israel and the Arab states and various international assemblies, 
such as the United Nations, the Arab League, and the Palestinian National Congress. 
Particular attention was paid to matters that related to Palestine and the rights and status 
of Palestinian refugees. Additionally, a number of articles were also devoted to 
recognizing support for the Palestinians within the international community, such as by 
Vietnam. 
The cultural material carried by Filasṭīn was focused on a much more narrow 
array of topics than was its political content. In addition to isolated articles on a variety of 
cultural topics, the editors of Filasṭīn produced several lengthy series of articles devoted 
to specific elements of Palestinian culture. Spanning from the supplement’s fourteenth 
issue to its forty-ninth were two series on Palestinian authors written by Mohammed 
Saleh Yunis, totaling over twenty articles. Each article highlighted a Palestinian poet or 
novelist. These articles were typically full-page, and frequently much longer—occupying 
a significant portion of the issue’s twelve pages. In addition to these informational pieces, 
every issue carried short literary pieces. Many of these were works by notable Palestinian 
authors, such as  anafani’s short story, “al-  arūs” (The Bride), and the poem, “kh ṭara fī 
al-sh ri  ” (Thoughts in the Street), by Mahmoud Darwish, but the newspaper also 
published numerous short poems submitted by readers.121 As expansive as its focus on 
Palestinian literary culture, Filasṭīn’s editors had a long-running emphasis on the 
geography and cultural history of Palestine. With only a handful of exceptions, every 
                                                 
121 Mahmoud Darwish, " hā ara F  Al-Shāri  ," Filasṭīn, April 20, 1967, 11  Ghassan  anafani, "Al-  Arūs," 
Filasṭīn, January 28, 1965, 10-11.  
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issue included an item highlighting a Palestinian town. Typically these were locations 
inside Israel, from which Palestinians had fled in 1948-1949. Most of these articles were 
short, nostalgic pieces, only a few paragraphs in length, like those featuring Abu Ghush 
and Kufr Kana.122 There were also several much longer pieces, such as “suqūṭ ḥaif ” (The 
Fall of Haifa), which recounted the history of the town’s occupation and the flight or 
expulsion of its Arab Palestinian occupants.123  
In addition to the newspaper’s cultural and political material, which typically 
accounted for approximately nine to ten of the issue’s twelve pages, there were a number 
of articles published, which might best be characterized as “practical” material. In 
general, these articles were more obviously editorial than was much of the newspaper’s 
other journalistic content—with the exception of such items as opinion columns and 
political cartoons. These pieces served to provide the newspaper’s perspective on specific 
topics directly pertaining to the liberation of Palestinian territory from Israel. Included in 
this category are such topics as guerrilla warfare and armed resistance, the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization, and al-Fataḥ and its armed element al- Asifa. Typically these 
were somewhat formulaic, first providing ostensibly objective information about a topic 
and then weighing in with Filasṭīn’s perspective or council on the matter. These articles 
were generally negative—advising caution or the need for further study of an issue before 
engagement by the Palestinian and Arab masses. Of course, these are not neatly delimited 
categories and many articles contained cultural, political, and practical elements. 
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INFLUENCING PALESTINIAN NATIONAL MEMORY 
Filasṭīn’s emphasis on intellectual topics indicates an interest in Palestinian 
culture, which at first may appear objective. But, as Filasṭīn was a politicized publication, 
written specifically to disseminate the Arab Nationalist Movement’s official perspective 
and counter the arguments of al-Fataḥ, this interest in Palestinian intellectual and 
historical topics requires greater scrutiny.124 Rather than undertaking an objective 
analysis of Palestinian culture and history, Filasṭīn’s engagement with Palestinian Arab 
culture was intended to shape the Palestinians’ collective memory of their own history 
and heritage, in order to advance the ANM’s narrative of Palestinian national identity. 
After the nakba, Palestinians faced a “bleak reality.” Of the 900,000 Palestinians 
who had previously lived in the area that came to be Israel, only approximately 20,000 
still retained their homes and means of livelihood. Another 40,000, who had lost their 
homes, means of livelihood, or both remained within Israel as refugees. In the course of 
the Israeli expansion during 1948 and 1949, approximately 1,000,000 (of an estimated 
1,400,00 total Palestinians) moved into, or remained in the “Gaza Strip” and “West 
Bank” areas, which did not come under Israeli control. An additional 300,000 fled 
Palestine to the surrounding Arab states, including approximately 100,000 to Transjordan 
(which also annexed the West Bank), 104,000 to Lebanon, and 82,000 to Syria.125 As 
seen in the previous chapter in the cases of Yasir Arafat, George Habash and their upper 
and middle class compatriots, some Palestinians were able to assimilate into the 
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economies of their new homes, but the vast majority of the working class and peasant 
refugees came to inhabit refugee camps with little hope for economic or social 
mobility.126 Like the Palestinian political structure, as discussed in the previous chapter, 
the social structure of the Palestinians was [severely traumatized and damaged in a way 
that required Palestinians to seek a new understanding of their situation] by the nakba.127 
In addition to the traumatic loss of life, home, and economic prospects that these 
Palestinians experienced as a result of the nakba, the dispersion had also severed the 
traditional social and political networks, upon which Palestinian identity had been based 
for centuries, as discussed in chapter 1. In effect, the Palestinians, who in April 1948 had 
constituted a 69% majority of the population in Palestine, had by 1949 become displaced 
and scattered throughout Israel and the surrounding Arab states, largely without 
economic prospects and isolated from the geographic and sociopolitical foundations of 
Palestinian identity.128  Traumatized and humiliated, the Palestinians after 1948 sought 
both to historicize the events of 1948 and to restore their own dignity.  
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Arab intellectuals immediately began to theorize about the cause of the Arab 
defeat in 1948 and, during the 1950s, a large body of work focusing on the plight of the 
Palestinians began to amass.129 Joining the pre-1948 body of Arab Nationalist 
scholarship, which included the influential work of Sati’ al-Husri, were a number of new 
political studies, including work Constantin Zurayk’s influential analysis Ma’nā al-
Nakba (“The Meaning of the Nakba”), which was cited by George Habash as one of the 
ANM’s primary ideological influences.130 Zurayk, a professor at the American University 
of Beirut, was an established Arab Nationalist thinker prior to the nakba and had 
published Al-Wa’ī al-Qawmi (“The National Consciousness”), a volume of essays 
arguing on national consciousness, in 1939.131 In Ma’nā al-Nakba, which Zurayk wrote 
in August 1948, he argues that the nakba was a catastrophe for the Arab people, caused 
by backwardness. This backwardness, he argues, must be overcome by the Arab nation 
through modernism and rationality.132  In addition to political studies, numerous poets, 
novelists, and playwrights addressed the Palestinians’ experiences during the nakba and 
the exigencies they suffered afterward. Filasṭīn engaged these topics as well. Rather than 
objectively analyze Palestinian history and culture, the editors of Filasṭīn selectively 
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emphasized elements that supported a Palestinian identity that complied with the ANM’s 
desired narrative, simultaneously targeting both Palestinian and non-Palestinian Arabs. 
A primary objective of nationalist literature is to restructure memory—both 
collective and individual, in effect, to replace alternative interpretive frameworks with a 
one that supports the nationalist narrative. This is done by giving preference to specific 
events and ideas that support the nationalist narrative, and ignoring or effacing those 
which detract from or problematize the intended history.133 Likewise, Filasṭīn 
emphasized specific themes and details in its studies of Palestinian history and culture to 
its own ends. 
A major element in Filasṭīn’s efforts to affect Palestinian identity was its 
engagement with the memory of Palestinian Arabs, particularly their collective memory 
of pre-nakba Palestinian society and to evoke a sense of cultural loss and victimhood. In 
Filasṭīn, much of this was done through a literary study—certainly to a great extent due 
to the influence of  anafani on the newspaper’s content. Highlighting the literary 
contributions of Palestinians served to emphasize Palestine’s reputation as one of the 
most relatively well-educated and literate areas in the Arab regions of the Ottoman 
Empire.134 It also attempted to produce a conception of Palestinians, not only among 
Palestinians but also among al-Muharrir’s non-Palestinian readers, which situated 
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Palestinians within the scholarly tradition of the nahda and post-nahda eras and therefore 
among the Arab intellectuals of Cairo and Beirut. The major portion of Filasṭīn’s analysis 
was conducted through a series of over twenty articles written by Mohammed Saleh 
Yunis, each featuring a different Palestinian writer. The articles, which overwhelmingly 
featured poets, provided some biographical information about their subjects, but were 
primarily concerned with discussing intellectual themes present in their work. Yunis’s 
greatest emphasis was on the nationalist themes and concepts expressed in the work of 
these authors and he reiterates in multiple articles that the roots of Palestinian nationalist 
poetry predate the nakba by decades.135 The dominant theme repeated throughout the 
articles is the position of waṭan, or homeland, in the work of these authors. In his article 
on Fadwa Tuqan (1917 – 2003), Yunis stresses this when he describes the “catastrophic 
rupture of [her] homeland and the displacement of its people” as one of three great 
personal tragedies in her life, which influenced her work.136 This trauma added to the 
pain she experienced due to the death of her brother, Ibrahim Tuqan (b. 1905) in 1941. 
Ibrahim, also a noted Palestinian poet, was a major influence in her life, and Yunis 
attributes an interest in the meanings of death (maut) and nothingness (‘adam) in her 
work to these traumatic episodes. Ibrahim, who was largely responsible for Fadwa’s 
education and introduction to poetry, was also an ardent nationalist and was vocally 
critical of the Palestinian leadership during the Mandate.137  
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Similarly, in his article on ‘Abd al-Rahim Mahmoud (1913 – 1948), Yunis 
highlights the poet’s deep nationalist feelings and opposition to the British. These 
sentiments led him to participate in the 1936 Revolt and the 1941 Rashid ‘Ali al-Kaylani 
coup in Iraq before he was killed fighting the Israeli expansion in Palestine in June 
1948.138 Prominent themes in his work included the conscience of the Arab people, the 
Balfour Declaration, and homeland, but he also emphasized that “speech and poetry 
would not be sufficient to solve his country’s problems” because Palestine was 
“handicapped” by its limited capacity for action.139 In support of his primarily emphasis 
on these poets’ nationalist sentiments, Yunis highlights other common themes that go 
hand-in-hand. Other common concepts include those of conscience and heroism, 
prominent in the work of Mutlaq ‘abd al-Khaliq, who wrote of the hero as an ordinary 
man; one who experiences fear, weakness, doubt and despair.140 In the poetry and prose 
of Ibrahim al-Dabbagh, Yunis highlights the concepts of responsibility and sacrifice, as 
al-Dabbagh declares his “absolute love” for freedom and asks his fellow countrymen 
when they will “give their blood” for their country.141 
In addition to Filasṭīn’s broad literary focus, the newspaper also printed a number 
of articles devoted to recalling the villages and locales of Palestine which were occupied 
or destroyed in the course of the nakba. Almost every issue of Filasṭīn featured a small 
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article under the heading of “From Your Country,” each of which reminisced about a 
location from which Palestinians had fled or been expelled in 1948-1949. These were 
short, nostalgic articles of around one hundred words each, which provided a small 
amount of basic information.  In addition to these smaller articles, Filasṭīn also published 
several much longer pieces, such as “The Fall of Haifa” in issue 15 (May 20, 1965), 
which provided more-detailed narratives about several of the larger Palestinian cities. 
These articles discussed the Arab efforts to defend against the Israelis advance and their 
eventual defeat, focusing less on nostalgia and more on the violence and trauma inflicted 
by the military campaign on the Palestinians.142 
Throughout these articles, Filasṭīn engaged with topics related to Palestinian 
culture in order to create and reinforce a particular collective memory of Palestine, which 
advanced its pan-Arab objective. The identity that Filasṭīn sought to formulate is not 
clearly defined, but it is implied by the themes the newspaper’s editors chose to 
emphasize. Those of trauma and loss of homeland supported a memory of the nakba 
focused on violence and social disintegration—which, forming the basis of pre-nakba 
Palestinian identity, translated into a loss of the pre-nakba self.143 On the other hand, 
emphasis on themes such as conscience and British and Zionist culpability in the nakba 
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and guilt for the Palestinians’ post-1948 situation suggested that the responsibility to 
rectify the Palestinians situation was shared by all Arabs.   
ARAB NATIONALIST POLITICAL EMPHASIS 
Despite Filasṭīn’s broad cultural objectives, the majority of its articles were 
written on political topics. These articles, which included approximately 150 full-length 
articles and several hundred shorter columns and opinion-pieces on various political 
topics, attempted to advance a political perspective among Filasṭīn’s Palestinian and non-
Palestinian readers which was in parallel with its cultural narrative. Like its cultural 
narrative, which we have seen supported a pan-Arab conception of Palestinian identity 
focused on a rich cultural heritage devastated by loss of the homeland and the destruction 
of social institutions, its political content supported a similar political narrative that 
advanced the Arab Nationalist Movement’s pan-Arab political objectives. These 
objectives, which included increasing non-Palestinian awareness of the Palestinians’ 
post-nakba plight and thereby evoking a sense of duty among all Arabs to aid the 
Palestinians, advocating the PLO as the Palestinians’ legitimate representative, and 
supporting al-Nasser’s political maneuvers against Israel and Western Imperialism. 
Unlike its cultural focus, which does not contradict or differ materially from that 
which might be supported by members of the Palestinian resistance’s alternative camp, 
such as the members of al-Fataḥ, the position adopted by Filasṭīn in its articles that focus 
on political topics clearly opposed that of al-Fataḥ, and in some cases responded directly 
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to it.144 As previously mentioned, the political topics that Filasṭīn addressed varied 
widely from issue to issue, but several topics were of constant concern to the newspaper. 
Two of these, in particular, clearly distinguish Filasṭīn’s perspective from that of al-
Fataḥ. The first is its treatment of the Palestinian Liberation Organization and the Arab 
states. While this is a broad category, which includes articles on many diverse sub-topics, 
Filasṭīn consistently voices support for the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian 
people, and for Gamal ‘abd al-Nasser as the leader in the Palestinians’ struggle against 
Israel and its occupation of Palestine.145 In particular, Filasṭīn’s coverage of the PLO was 
consistently supportive of the organization’s claim to be the official representative body 
of the Palestinian people and was uncritical of its policies and actions. In May 1965, for 
instance, Filasṭīn published an anonymous two-part series reviewing the PLO’s 
achievements during its first year in existence, which coincided with the second 
Palestinian National Council to be held on the 28
th
 of that same month in Gaza. 146 In the 
first article, Filasṭīn asserted that the organization’s first year had been “crowded with 
activity,” which had laid a foundation for political achievements which would be difficult 
for Israel to undo. The author states that it is necessary to discuss the nature and 
significance of the organization’s achievements, but because of the uniqueness of the 
organization, these achievements can only be judged by the organization’s own standard. 
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The author then describes the evolution of the PLO’s structure and organization during 
the previous year, including the selection of its executive committee, the national council, 
and the clarification of several articles of its charter. He also elaborates on the articles of 
the charter which deal with the organization’s ability to raise military units, first 
explaining that the charter authorizes the PLO to raise units as is deemed necessary by 
the Arab leadership, but also reminding readers that the objective of these units is not to 
serve as the decisive force in a future war against Israel. Rather, this function will remain 
the responsibility of the armies of the Arab states and the units raised by the PLO are to 
function as a strike force, or a commando vanguard, to be employed at the discretion of 
the Arab armies.147 
Throughout the article, the author’s concern is one of clarification, and any 
element of criticism is completely absent. While not explicitly referring to any particular 
public debate over the PLO, the author gives a strong sense that he is responding to 
ongoing discussion or confusion related to the PLO, with the intent of providing clarity 
that will settle the issue for good. This debate is strongly implied at the closing of the 
article, when the author states that the problem the PLO continues to face is that of the 
unification of the numerous factions of the resistance. Achieving this, he says, will be a 
“big step forward” in the effectiveness of the organization.148 In effect, Filastin 
responded to two debates in this article. Through its uncritical engagement with the PLO, 
in contrast with al-Fatah, which rejected Ahmed Shuqairy’s patronage of al-Nasser and 
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the Arab states, it implicitly supported the PLO’s legitimacy as the representative body of 
the Palestinian people.149 Equally noteworthy, Filastin’s treatment of the PLO in this 
article, in particular its deliberate clarification of articles of the organization’s charter, 
addresses a debate regarding the PLO within the ANM. Initially, some within the ANM 
were critical of the way in which Shukairy established the PLO, in particular the way in 
which the representatives in its governing bodies were to be elected and what they 
perceived as a lack of revolutionary character in the organization.150 Although transparent 
to readers unaware of the ANM’s internal politics, Filastin’s treatment here directly 
addresses this internal debate, and should be viewed as a move to end the discussion 
within the ANM by providing a final word on the issue. The second article in the series, 
published in the newspaper’s next issue, consists of three statements from the PLO, and 
further emphasizes the newspaper’s support for the PLO.151 These responses, submitted 
by the PLO’s research center, by Shafiq al-Hut, the director of the organization’s Beirut 
office, and by Nicola al-Durr, a member of the executive committee, discuss their 
opinions on the organization’s achievements, policies, and the way forward. Despite the 
subtitle of the article, “Thalātha Radūd Min Dākhil al-Munẓama f  Muḥāwila li-Taqy m 
Al-Tajriba Mauḍu’iyyān (Three Responses from Inside the Organization in an Attempt 
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to Evaluate the Experience Objectively—emphasis added), the statements are published 
without comment from Filasṭīn or any of the PLO’s critics.152  
This treatment is consistent in Filasṭīn’s coverage of the PLO and organizations 
affiliated to it or to the ANM. Similar to the PLO officials’ responses published by 
Filasṭīn in May 1965, in the January 26, 1967, edition Filasṭīn printed an article entitled 
“’Abṭ l al-‘Auda’ Yaqūmūn bi-Gh ra N jiḥa  Al  Bait Jabrīn” (The Heroes of the Return 
Undertake Successful Raid of Beit Jibrin), which offers a further example of favorable 
coverage of such affiliated organizations.153 In the article, Filasṭīn relates a recent 
statement released by the guerrilla organization Abtal al-‘auda (“The Heroes of the 
Return”) publicizing a raid it conducted from Jordan into Israel. The organization, which 
was an ANM-affiliated fedayeen group, was formed with the PLO’s approval in October 
1966 in response to mounting criticism of the ANM’s refusal to initiate guerrilla warfare 
against Israel.154 The article begins by summarizing the statement’s account of the 
actions conducted by a detachment of the group during a raid conducted during the 
previous week. Filasṭīn then publishes, verbatim and without commentary, a statement 
from the group decrying “traitors” in the Arab states and stating that the fedayeen will not 
forget the sacrifices of those who came before.155 
These articles discussing groups within the pan-Arab camp contrast starkly with 
those discussing organizations which were not aligned closely with the ANM and the 
                                                 
152 Filas  n, "Munḍima Al-Taḥr r F    Ām: Thalātha Radūd Min Dākhil Al-Munẓama F  Muḥāwila Li-
Taqy m Al-Tajriba Mauḍu  Iyyān," Filastin, May 26, 1965, 4-5. 
153 Filas  n, "“Ab āl Al-  Auda” Yaqūmūn Bi-Ghāra Nājiḥa  Alā Bait Jabr n," Filasṭīn, January 26, 1967, 9. 
154 Sayigh, "Reconstructing the Paradox," 626. 
155 Filas  n, "“Ab āl Al-  Auda” Yaqūmūn Bi-Ghāra Nājiḥa  Alā Bait Jabr n," Filastin, January 26, 1967, 9. 
 73 
PLO. Rather, the articles were more critical and were written in a more negative tone 
overall. When discussing these groups, such as al-Asifa, with which the ANM differed on 
elements of strategy, but still fell within the resistance movement, Filasṭīn was but not 
openly hostile, but neither did it agree unquestioningly. In the February 11, 1965 issue, 
Filasṭīn discussed a recent debate which had taken place in its parent newspaper, al-
Muharrir (also edited by Ghassan Kanafani), around several recent al-‘Āsifa political and 
military statements. Filasṭīn reprinted portions of three articles which had been published 
in recent editions of al-Muharrir. In the first, al-Muharrir argued that, while guerrilla 
action has been a part of resistance in Palestine for years, it was unclear how al-‘Āsifa’s 
plans would lead to the liberation of Palestine. Al-Muharrir further suggested that al-
‘Āsifa’s plan may be in conflict with the “official” Palestinian plan (i.e., that of Gamal 
‘abd al-Nasser and the PLO), and that al-‘Āsifa needed to clarify how commando 
operations could to lead to a war that would liberate Palestine. Filasṭīn then summarized 
two responses printed in subsequent issues of al-Muharrir—one by a member of a al-
‘Āsifa and another disputing al-‘Āsifa’s claims that guerrilla action against Israel will lead 
to the liberation of Palestine.156 While not flatly refuting al-‘Āsifa’s statement, Filasṭīn’s 
publication of alternative viewpoints and critical arguments illustrates a distinct 
divergence from the coverage it gave to groups within its own organizational network.  
Filasṭīn’s most intense criticism was reserved for Israel and those entities that 
opposed al-Nasser’s movement altogether, including Arab states not aligned with Egypt. 
In one such example, an article entitled “New Schemes for the Liquidation of the 
                                                 
156 Filas  n, "Al-  Asifa Wa Mintaq Al-  Amal Al-Fidā  ," Filastin, February 11, 1965, 5. 
 74 
Palestinian Issue,” which alleged a joint Saudi-Jordanian plot to sabotage the PLO, 
Filasṭīn engages an acrimonious tone typically reserved for discussions of Israel. Calling 
Hajj Amin al-Husayni a “tool” of Jordan and Saudi Arabia, Filasṭīn accuses Jordan and 
the Higher Arab Committee of orchestrating a plot to eliminate the Palestinian entity 
because it was a danger to the interests of Jordan, Israel and America.157  
This editorial approach, despite claims of objectivity on the part of Filastin, 
clearly illustrated the newspaper’s support of organizations within the nationalist camp 
attempted to undermine and criticize those entities in opposition to it. 
THE ROLE OF ARMED STRUGGLE IN THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE 
The second area in which the ideological distance between Filasṭīn’s leadership 
and that of the opposing Palestinian factions is clear is in its articles discussing the role 
and function of “armed resistance” or “guerrilla action” against Israel. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, al-Fataḥ supported immediate commando engagement of Israel, with 
the intent of provoking a war between Israel and the Arab states. While the Arab 
Nationalist Movement supported this, in theory, prior to the outbreak of war in 1967, the 
ANM adhered to an increasingly unpopular position that maintained the time was not yet 
right for widespread guerrilla activity.158 Furthermore, they argued, provoking a war 
before the correct conditions were set would have disastrous results for the Arabs. While, 
this position became increasingly unpopular in the mid-1960s, Filasṭīn’s treatment of the 
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issue continued to support al-Nasser’s timeline, despite the ANM’s growing internal 
conflict.159 
That this was a complicated issue for the ANM, is clearly reflected in the position 
Filasṭīn took toward fedayeen action against Israel. Because of popular support among 
the Palestinian population for armed resistance and the ANM’s own bifurcated position 
on the issue, it could not be too openly critical of the guerrillas. On the other hand, 
because of the ANM’s official position delaying widespread guerrilla action in deference 
to Gamal ‘abd al-Nasser’s programme, neither could Filasṭīn be too supportive or 
enthusiastic.160 The result of this conflicted position was that the newspaper’s articles 
were generally supportive at a theoretical level, but consistently cautioned hesitation and 
a need for further study before Palestinians initiated large-scale commando operations. 
Throughout its publication, Filasṭīn printed a number of articles dealing with a elements 
of guerrilla warfare employing this approach. Filasṭīn’s editors were fond of comparing 
Palestine to other popular movements around the world, particularly those in China and 
Vietnam.161 In one such article, detailing North Vietnamese success using guerrilla 
warfare against French and American forces, the author notes that, while the peasants in 
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occupied countries like Vietnam and Palestine are the major force, due to long foreign 
occupation, they lack military expertise.162 Guerrilla warfare is the method by which it is 
possible to turn their military weakness into strength. Filasṭīn then provides certain 
principles, such as striking the enemy where he is weak and immediate dispersal after 
attacks—to overcome the enemy’s technological advantage and to prevent the enemy 
from identifying the guerrillas or counterattacking. While not elaborated in the article, 
these principles had already been employed by Palestinians, such as by Sheikh Izz al-Din 
al-Qassam, against British forces during the Mandate.163 The article continues, however, 
to point out that because of the guerrilla’s limited capability, he cannot win decisively 
against a traditional military power. The final victory can only be achieved by the 
destruction of the enemy’s forces in a traditional military campaign. The guerrilla 
remains important throughout this campaign, by continuing to degrade and destroy the 
enemy’s bases and reserves.164 As a final word, Filasṭīn also points out that, since the 
Palestinians’ officers have been trained under guerrilla conditions, they lack “some of the 
contemporary military arts.” 
In another article discussing “The Art of Guerrilla Warfare,” Filasṭīn analyzed the 
ambush as a form of guerrilla attack. The article, essentially a doctrinal text, lists the 
types of ambushes, and provides a list of steps for planning and conducting each. 
Explaining that an ambush is “a surprise attack against a mobile enemy without the 
objective of occupying the ground permanently,” Filasṭīn distinguishes between hasty 
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and planned ambushes and discusses planning considerations for each type, such as site 
selection and initiation of the attack. The articles even goes so far as to include a list of 
signals to use during the attack, such as to mark the approach of the enemy, to first 
initiate and later to cease fire, and to withdraw from the ambush once the attack is 
complete.165 Despite this apparent—if tacit—approval of guerrilla action, in its next issue 
Filasṭīn returned to its reserved theoretical stance on the efficacy and appropriateness of 
armed struggle by the Palestinian resistance. Quoting Clausewitz’s statement that “war is 
politics by other means,” Burhan al-Dajani suggests that al-qatal (“killing”) may be a 
neccessary element of the solution to the Palestians’ current situation.166 Al-Dajani argues 
that killing—which he distinguishes from war conducted among states in accordance 
with international law—has been a part of every war of colonial independence since 
World War II, including Vietnam, Laos, China, and in the Congo. Al-Dajani argues that, 
in light of the historical effectiveness of killing in this context, this “abstract” research 
requires that the practicality of guerrilla warfare in the Palestinian context be examined 
and the type of killing most applicable be determined. Al-Dajani leaves the question open 
for further discussion, concluding that three more issues must be considered in order to 
resolve it completely: the choice between peaceful coexistence and revolution; if killing 
is unavoidable, the form that should be used; and, the extent that it is possible to fuse the 
killing with the movement’s political aims.  
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Filasṭīn’s position regarding guerrilla engagement of Israel did evolve during its 
publication, particularly after the Heroes of the Return was formed in the fall of 1966.167 
While stopping short of openly supporting commando incursions into Israel even up to 
the beginning of the June 1967 war, Filasṭīn’s commentary in articles discussing the 
fedayeen became more positive as Egypt and its allies became increasingly aggressive 
toward Israel and the newspaper emphasized the negative impact of such actions within 
Israeli politics and society. This emphasis became particularly strident in the months 
leading up to the war. In one such article, “Qalq Isrā  īl  Wāsi  al-Na āq Ba  ad al-  Amaliāt 
al-Fidā  īa al-Akh ra” (Israeli Anxiety is Widespread after the Recent Guerrilla 
Operations), published in January 1967, Filasṭīn announced the activity of a new 
guerrilla squad, the ’Abd al-Latif al-Sharuru group, and reprinted a portion of the band’s 
political statement.
168
 Filasṭīn then lauded the success of the group and suggested that 
Israeli news coverage and official statements relating to the attack were misleading and 
attempted to downplay the incident’s success. This complimentary stance on guerrilla 
warfare, which coincided with a general escalation in the conflict during 1967, including 
the blockade of the Straits of Tiran by Egyptian forces in May of that year, clearly 
illustrates a major evolution in the newspaper’s stance on guerrilla warfare during the 
course of its publication.169 As compared to its critical coverage of al-‘Āsifa in February 
                                                 
167 Shemesh states that the PLO’s position on armed warfare began to change in the spring of 1966  
starting in May of that year, Shukairy and the PLO began to praise the fida’i action and later even referred 
to the PLO as a fida’i organization. This change was shaped by the same forces influencing the ANM’s 
own internal conflict over anti-Israeli guerrilla warfare. Shemesh, 88. 




of 1965, by the spring of 1967 Filastin not only printed the statement of the ’Abd al-Latif 
al-Sharuru group without criticism, implicitly supporting the band, but praised the 
organization’s negative impact within Israel.170 
By May of 1967, military action had grown to become the primary focus of the 
newspaper. The May 18, 1967 issue, which bore the headline “r ’iḥat al-barūd  ala al-
ḥaḍūr al-sūrīa al-isr ’īlīa” (The Smell of Gunpowder on the Syrian-Israeli Border) 
focused almost exclusively on a coming battle between the Arabs and Israel. Included in 
the edition were articles such as “gh r t fid ’īa ṣ ’aqa tajt ḥ isr ’īl” (Lightning Guerrilla 
Raids are Sweeping Israel), detailing recent “Heroes of the Return” operations and 
praising the activity of the guerrillas and their impact of their actions against the 
Palestinians enemies, as well as others emphasizing Arab strength and suggesting that 
Britain had a hand in the 1948 Arab defeat by confiscating weapons from the Palestinians 
and giving them to the Jews.171  
Likewise, the June 1, 1967 issue, which was published during the Egyptian 
blockade of the Straits of Tiran, strongly emphasized Arab strength and Israeli panic. 
One-third of the edition’s twelve pages were devoted to articles explaining the 
significance of Akaba to Israeli survival and the decisive effect its blockade was sure to 
have on the Israeli people.172 In another article, “al-jim hīr al-‘arabiyya tajaddad 
muw qi’ih  fī al-ma’araka” (The Arab Masses Renew their Positions in the Battle), 
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Filasṭīn reports that not only were the Arab armies and governments preparing for battle, 
but so also were all the “nationalist and progressive forces in the rest of the Arab land.”173 
The article, in which Filasṭin comes its closest to an all-out call-to-arms, explains that the 
all the revolutionary youth of Lebanon were at that time rallying around the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization, the “symbol of [the] struggle” and “leader of [the] struggle.” 
The article then reports on announcements from the revolutionary forces and the 
Lebanese University announcing their support of the United Arab Republic and Syria in 
their struggle against Zionism and colonialism. Still in heated competition with al-‘Āsifa 
for influence within the movement, the article points out that these statements affirm that 
the authority to recruit for the military purposes belongs to the PLO, under the 
supervision of the Lebanese Army.174  
The shift seen in Filasṭin’s position on armed struggle clearly illustrates the 
importance of the issue to the ANM and the other organizations within the resistance 
movement, as well as the heated contention surrounding its use. Filasṭin gives only a 
modest insight into the position of other organizations on the use of armed resistance 
through explicit engagement with their communiques and statements, but implicitly 
provides a wealth of information about the issue within the ANM during this time period. 
Despite the fact that the ANM stopped short of announcing large-scale guerrilla warfare 
against Israel prior to the beginning of the June 1967 war, the softening of its position on 
the matter, in conjunction with the increased space for activity that growing Egyptian 
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aggression against Israel provided to the Arab Nationalist organizations, indicates that 
such a move could have been imminent, had war not broken out on June 5
th
.175  
EVOLUTION IN FILASṬĪN’S CONTENT, 1965-1967 
This shift in Filasṭīn’s position on guerrilla warfare against Israel  was only an 
element in the evolution of its overall content as relations between Israel and its Arab 
neighbors grew more heated in the months leading up to the June 1967 war. In addition to 
its softened stance on commando organizations, Filasṭīn displayed a shift in overall 
content that constituted a decrease in emphasis on Palestinian culture and an increase in 
emphasis on the military aspects of the resistance. While some of aspects of the 
newspaper’s content remained largely unchanged, for instance the frequent inclusion of 
works of short fiction and poetry and the short geographical blurbs “From Your 
Country,” long articles on literary topics became sparse starting in the spring of 1966 and 
ceased altogether after September of that year. On the other hand, interest in fedayeen 
and “martyrs” of the Palestinian resistance increased simultaneously. Starting in the fall 
of 1966, Filasṭīn ran articles of varying lengths informing readers of developments in the 
internment and prosecution of al-‘Āsifa guerrilla Mahmoud abd al-Fataḥ Hijaz, who had 
been captured at the beginning of the year and was being held in Israeli custody.176 
Additionally, starting in February 1967, the back page of every issue featured a “wajh 
filasṭīnī” (A Palestinian Face)—a short article on a member of the resistance. Typically 
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these individuals had been killed or gone missing in the conduct of guerrilla activities. 
Despite this shift in focus, as we have already seen, Filasṭīn’s editorial stance remained 
steadfastly in line with ‘abd al-Nasser’s political plan. 
CONCLUSION 
The steadfast adherence to Egyptian president Gamal ‘abd al-Nasser’s pan-Arab 
political agenda that Filasṭīn illustrated ultimately led to the downfall of the Arab 
Nationalist Movement after the Israeli victory in the June 1967 war. Egypt’s spectacular 
defeat discredited its president’s program. Those organizations tied closely to it, such as 
the ANM and PLO, underwent periods of major upheaval. Both subsequently 
experienced fundamental reorganization as a result of the repercussions of the failure of 
pan-Arabism as a political solution to the Palestinian issue became apparent. The initial 
leadership of the PLO, much of hailed from the older generation of Palestinian social 
elite—including PLO president, Ahmed Shukairy—lost much of their remaining political 
clout and by 1968 al-Fataḥ, whose outlook had been apparently confirmed by the Arab 
loss, had captured control of the organization. This ideological crisis proved to be too 
much for the ANM, which had already been fighting fragmentation for almost five years. 
After 1967, the several factions of the ANM split off to form new organizations, 
including the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, led by Nayef Hawatmah, 
and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, headed by former ANM leader 
George Habash. These groups, which ultimately adopted Marxist philosophies, searched 
broadly for new underpinnings upon which to base their political theories.  Stripped of 
their previous reluctance to engage in extensive guerrilla activity, these groups now 
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adopted a model of armed struggle that targeted not only Israel and its interests, but also 
individuals and organizations viewed by the militants as supporting and aiding Israel, 
such as the United States. These new guerrilla groups, of which the PFLP was the most 
notorious and longest-lived, embraced a philosophy of armed struggle that placed great 
emphasis on spectacular terrorist attacks, particularly against international commercial 
and transportation infrastructure. These organizations, in cooperation with New Left 
guerrilla groups from Europe and Asia conducted a number of spectacular attacks around 




The June 1967 Arab-Israeli War marked a major transition in the Palestinian 
Resistance, and the beginning of a period during which it reformulated the theoretical 
bases of its revolutionary principles. Both the Arab Nationalist Movement and al-Fatah 
experienced major evolutions during the following years.177 Within months, the ANM, 
now unable to withstand its internal schismatic forces, split into three guerrilla 
organizations. The conservative faction, under the leadership of George Habash, joined 
with the “Heroes of the Return” to form the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. 
The new organization adopted a much more aggressive strategy of resistance and a 
broadly-construed conception of the enemy, engaging in a campaign of international 
terrorism from that continued from 1968 through the mid-1970s.178  
The al-Fatah mainstream, which won a controlling interest in the PLO in 1968, 
began a process of increasing the PLO’s political sway, creating a “state without a 
state.”179 But al-Fatah did not give up the guerrilla struggle altogether. Jordanian attempts 
to expel the PLO from its borders in September 1970 resulted in a civil war between 
Jordanian military forces and Palestinian militant. This episode then became the 
namesake for the “Black September Organization” – a terrorist sub-group of al-Fatah, 
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which was responsible for the operation that resulted in the death of the members of the 
1972 Israeli Olympic team.180 
In many ways, the evolutions of these two organizations after 1967 represent a 
continuation of the transformative political and social processes that Palestinian society 
had been experiencing for the previous hundred years. While still bereft of their ancestral 
homeland, the PLO embarked on a process whereby it continually endeavored to become 
more state-like, until finally realizing official administrative and territorial form in the 
shape of the Palestinian Authority as a result of the 1993 Oslo Accords with Israel.181 
As for Habash and his fellows in the ANM, who persistently rejected any political 
compromise which preserved the existence of the state of Israel, resistance violence 
followed a familiar pattern after 1967.182 Much like the removal of traditional constraints 
to Palestinian tribal violence led to peasant resistance without strategic direction during 
the British Mandate, the terrorism of the PFLP and other similar organizations during the 
late 1960s and early 1970s failed to achieve any of its perpetrators’ strategic 
objectives.183 By substituting a Marxist interpretation of the Palestinian issue for an Arab 
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Nationalist one, Habash still sought to rectify the causes responsible for the Arab defeat 
in 1948 - and now in 1967, as well – but through a new analytical framework. While 
adopting a Marxist ideology attracted strong support from European and Asian leftist 
radicals, it failed to understand the Palestinian reality.184 Despite the remarkable 
internationalism that existed within the movement from 1969 to roughly 1977, ultimately 
the groups’ unfocused and haphazard attacks, including scores of airline hijackings and 
the kidnapping of OPEC executives from Vienna in 1975 in a joint PFLP/RAF/JRA 
operation, failed to incite a peoples’ war and instead resulted in the death or capture of 
much of the movement’s primary leadership by the mid-1970s.  
  
                                                                                                                                                 
that this violence may be better understood as “solipsistic,” or self-directed, and intended to serve a 
therapeutic role, much in the sense of Fanon’s argument in favor of violence in “The Wretched of the 
Earth.” In particular, Lustick points to themes in the work of  anafani and other Palestinian authors, which 
mirror those of humiliation and trauma which were emphasized in Filastin. In addition to these, Lustick 
highlights a need for revitalization and the rebuilding of national self-esteem. I. S. Lustick, "Changing 
Rationales for Political Violence in the Arab-Israeli Conflict," Journal of Palestine Studies 77, no. 20 i 
(1990): 54, 64-70. 
184 Samir Franjieh argues that, while the PFLP applied a Marxist template to the case of the Palestinians, 
the group’s analysis was incorrect. In particular, conflating the displaced Palestinians with an urban 
proletariat was an error, because the Palestinians were by and large rural peasants who had not suffered 
economic exploitation by any of the entities the PFLP sought to oppose. Rather than wage a popular war of 
liberation, this group wished to return to their previous agrarian vocations in Palestine, or in the case of 
West Bank Palestinians who still occupied their ancestral territory, “the acquisition of a political 
identity.”Samir Franjieh, "How Revolutionary Is the Palestinian Resistance? A Marxist Interpretation," 
Journal of Palestine Studies 1, no. 2 (1972): 57. 
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